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This thesis explores the definition of FORCEnet, 
determines what degree of consensus exists about its 
concepts and evaluates the Joint Fires Network against 
FORCEnet principles. 
The military has been moving toward network based 
information operations, but struggles to stay current with 
information technology (IT). 
IT and knowledge management are not mature 
disciplines.  The services struggle to choose durable 
standards, processes and systems, and field them across a 
vast enterprise quickly.  Additionally, complex acquisition 
and configuration processes are incapable of producing 
interoperable networks on the timescale of IT growth.  
Though the services and agencies have fielded capable 
systems in the past, they become legacy if a newer standard 
is adopted that disenfranchises them.  Organizational 
transformation is required to support flexibility in the 
Department of Defense. 
Sea Power 21 is a comprehensive attempt to address the 
implications of the IT revolution.  The legs of the vision 
are Sea Basing, Sea Shield and Sea Strike.  The enabler is 
FORCEnet, “the operational construct and architectural 
framework of naval warfare in the information age that 
integrates Warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat force that is scalable across all levels 
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This thesis explores the definition of FORCEnet, 
determines what degree of consensus exists about its 
concepts and evaluates the Joint Fires Network against 
FORCEnet principles. 
The military has been moving toward network based 
information operations, but struggles to stay current with 
information technology (IT). 
IT and knowledge management are not mature 
disciplines.  The services struggle to choose durable 
standards, processes and systems, and field them across a 
vast enterprise quickly.  Additionally, complex acquisition 
and configuration processes are incapable of producing 
interoperable networks on the timescale of IT growth.  
Though the services and agencies have fielded capable 
systems in the past, they become legacy if a newer standard 
is adopted that disenfranchises them.  Organizational 
transformation is required to support such flexibility in 
the Department of Defense. 
Sea Power 21 is a comprehensive attempt to address the 
implications of the IT revolution.  The legs of the vision 
are Sea Basing, Sea Shield and Sea Strike.  The enabler is 
FORCEnet, “the operational construct and architectural 
framework of naval warfare in the information age that 
integrates Warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat force that is scalable across all levels 
of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land.” 
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There is consensus at the senior leadership levels 
about the scope of FORCEnet and its implications, but the 
complexity implied by the FORCEnet concepts is not trivial.  
A capability-based architecture development process using 
sound system engineering practices is an effective 
approach.  Because of its deliberative and capability-based 
nature, this approach will be at odds with both the 
institutional need for accelerated development to address 
emerging threats, and a platform-oriented versus 
capability-oriented acquisition system. 
The FORCEnet architecture should help to clarify the 
boundaries around existing systems such as the Joint Fires 
Network (JFN).  Comparing existing system and technical 
architectures to conceptual and operational architectures 
is subjective, but necessary until the operational view to 
systems view gap is bridged.  Until that gap is filled, the 
following actions are recommended:  
• Explore other FORCEnet interpretations and adjust 
the proposed assessment framework accordingly. 
• Develop a consistent method for doing the 
assessment by comparing other systems to 
FORCEnet. 
• Add a Marine Corps perspective to this thesis and 
assess FORCEnet compliance of USMC systems. 
• Determine the development path JFN should follow 
to continue toward fuller compliance with 
FORCEnet. 
FORCEnet is intended to transcend organizational 
boundaries.  There is little discussion of how FORCEnet 
will achieve interoperability, politically and 
organizationally, with other services and agencies.  The 
Navy funds individual systems and platforms, while FORCEnet 
  xviii
requirements and acquisition requires providing 
capabilities across many systems and platforms.  Strong 
leadership is necessary to accelerate organizational 



























The Navy, and the military services in general have 
been moving toward network based information operations for 
many years.  This movement is a natural and integral part 
of the military’s larger command and control mission.  
Despite continuous military momentum in the field, 
information theory and technology have accelerated so 
rapidly that the military, once a leader in the field, 
struggles to stay current.  The rapid expansion of the 
Internet and the resulting growth of civilian demand for 
information technology (IT) services at the lowest levels 
have also challenged the military’s ability to stay up to 
date. 
Two major issues arise in the analysis of this 
struggle.  First, information technology and knowledge 
management as disciplines are far from mature.  Despite the 
explosive growth of the IT sector over the past decade, 
vocabulary, standards and practices continue to be filled 
with ambiguity, and theories continue to develop rapidly.  
Early in the IT revolution the military was among the 
biggest IT consumers and able to dictate standards in order 
to ensure the unhindered flow of information to its war 
fighters and among its various services.  For many 
legitimate reasons, IT leadership has gradually moved to 
the private sector, resulting in a beneficial expansion of 
innovation, but accompanied by a multiplication of 
standards.  At the same time that the services were 
attempting to create even more tightly interoperable 
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forces, the military found itself a minor player in the IT 
sector and no longer able to set standards, even though the 
need was more important than ever.  As a result, the 
services are severely challenged when choosing standards, 
processes and systems, hoping they will remain durable and 
trying to field them across a vast enterprise in a 
reasonable amount of time. 
Second, the military's complex acquisition and 
configuration control processes have had difficulty 
producing and maintaining a truly interoperable network of 
information systems on a timescale consistent with the IT 
sector’s expansion and growth rate.  The existing 
acquisition and configuration control management systems 
evolved to ensure, to the extent possible, that technology 
was adopted in such a manner that war fighters would not 
find themselves with incompatible, unsupported, ineffective 
or obsolete equipment.  This measured approach often 
resulted in self-reliant systems that fielded all the 
components necessary to do a mission from sensors and 
processors to command and control and weapons.  Though 
normally effective, these types of systems were not 
primarily designed to be interoperable with other systems 
and were very difficult and expensive to upgrade.  They are 
often referred to as “stove pipe” or “legacy” systems.  The 
use of system engineering practices in the acquisition 
process has made it more flexible and efficient, but the 
increasingly complex IT component of most projects 
continues to be a development challenge for system 
engineers. 
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At the same time, private IT entrepreneurs work as 
fast as humanely possible to field genuinely good ideas in 
the hope that they will be adopted as industry standards.  
The resulting movement of the IT industry is not always in 
the interest of the military.  Even though the military 
services and agencies have successfully fielded mission 
capable information systems in the past, they must deal 
with the potential legacy nature of these systems if a 
newer standard is adopted that disenfranchises one system 
or another. 
Organizational transformation of some form or other in 
the Department of Defense (DOD) appears to be required to 
rapidly adopt emerging technologies in a unified manner.  
Transformation defies an easy definition, but in the Navy, 
it is safe to say that an organizational recognition exists 
that the monumental changes taking place in the information 
and knowledge management fields have been and will continue 
to affect every aspect of the naval enterprise from the 
simplest maintenance and training tasks all the way to 
combat. 
This transformation is just beginning to be organized 
and quantified.  The current Chief of Naval Operations’ 
(CNO) vision, Sea Power 21, is a comprehensive attempt to 
organize the disparate efforts across the naval enterprise 
into a coherent whole to effectively deal with the 
implications if the IT revolution.  The unifying component 
of the vision is FORCEnet, 
…the operational construct and architectural 
framework for Naval Warfare in the Information 
Age which integrates Warriors, sensors, networks, 
command and control, platforms and weapons into a 
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networked, distributed combat force, scalable 
across the spectrum of conflict from seabed to 
space and from sea to land.1 
FORCEnet evolved from work done by the CNO’s Strategic 
Studies Group (SSG) over the past four years (SSG’s XVIII, 
XIX, XX, XXI).  The SSG was tasked to review the 
capabilities that the future Naval force will need to 
produce revolutionary improvement in key operational tasks.  
The result of the work was the SSG’s definition of FORCEnet 
as the means to achieve these revolutionary improvements.  
As a key element of Sea Power 21, FORCEnet enables the 
pillars of Sea Strike (projecting precise and persistent 
offensive power), Sea Shield (projecting global defensive 
assurance), and Sea Basing (projecting sustainable joint 
operational independence).  FORCEnet also incorporates the 
supporting initiatives of Sea Trial (accelerating enhanced 
capabilities to the Fleet through innovation and 
experimentation), Sea Enterprise (maximizing business 
efficiencies), and Sea Warrior (maximizing human capital) 
to bring about these changes. 
The definition of FORCEnet lies at the conceptual 
level and this has generated uncertainty about what it 
actually is.  The entire Navy and Marine Corps will 
eventually be affected by FORCEnet, but because it is a 
relatively new framework, understanding has not permeated 
the organization.  This understanding will take time while 
higher-level organizations interpret the concepts into 
operational architectures and reconcile those with existing 
system and technical architectures. 
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1 CNO SSG XXI, Accelerating FORCEnet-Winning in the Information Age, 
p. xvii. 
In the interim, existing systems such as the Joint 
Fires Network have two challenges.  They must continue to 
evolve as useful tools given the current state of the 
infrastructure and they must proactively figure out what to 
do to function effectively in the developing short-term 




The objective of this thesis is to explore the 
definition of FORCEnet, determine what degree of 
organizational consensus exists in the Navy about its 
concepts and evaluate the Joint Fires Network against the 
resulting FORCEnet framework. 
 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Scope 
The thesis will describe the current understanding of 
FORCEnet held by several of the major responsible 
organizations, but will not analyze the research used by 
each to reach its conclusions. 
The thesis will attempt to tie together the various 
interpretations of FORCEnet into a framework that can be 
used to assess how well existing systems fit within the 
concept, but it will neither add nor create new factors, 
nor exclude contradictions. 
The study will assess JFN as an expected component of 
FORCEnet, and review its consistency with the factors 
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described by FORCEnet.  Since the topic easily lends itself 
to an expansive exploration of the organizational, 
technological and doctrinal issues affecting both ideas, 
the thesis will be limited to architectural issues with 
organizational influences as necessary. 
The study will not analyze FORCEnet or JFN as the 
Naval component of any particular joint architecture, but 
will discuss interfaces with joint systems and 
architectures as necessary. 
 
2. Methodology 
Comparative analysis will be used to generate a simple 
FORCEnet framework and to assess the consistency of 
existing systems with that framework. 
Because of the rapidly evolving nature of both 
FORCEnet and JFN, the majority of the data collected for 
the thesis comes from various program offices and resource 
sponsors.  It is generally in the form of architecture-
level briefings and limited documentation, both of which 
become obsolete quickly.  Interviews are used to fill in 
areas not otherwise covered. 
 
3. Primary Research Question 
What is FORCEnet?  Is it a concept, construct or both.  
What are its characteristics and what does it mean for the 





4. Subsidiary Research Questions 
Is the Navy already beginning to implement FORCEnet by 
using existing systems and architectures, or does FORCEnet 
require new technology, techniques and doctrine? 
a. What is the concept and architecture of 
FORCEnet, and what does it mean to the organizations 
charged with implementing it? 
b. What is the concept and architecture of the 
present JFN baseline? 
c. What are the differences and similarities 
between FORCEnet and JFN? 




This study makes the following general assumptions: 
a. Existing and anticipated technology will 
support projected architectures and capabilities.  The 
technology to move data around is generally thought to be 
achievable to the level required to support FORCEnet.  The 
technology to manage the information and knowledge 
associated with FORCEnet in its fullest development will 
probably require considerable investment to achieve. 
b. Organizational barriers can be overcome.  A 
challenge of answering the research questions is to 
reconcile the different biases of the responsible agencies 
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in order to determine what the points of agreement and 
disagreement are between them. 
c. Funding resources will be reasonably 
available in the medium to long term to support the 
anticipated research, development and fielding.  Near term 
funding is a challenge due to requirements of the budget 
process. 
The responsible agencies make variations of these 
assumptions along with specific assumptions that will be 
discussed where appropriate. 
 
6. Benefit of the Study 
The anticipated result of the research will be to 
determine what the Navy organizational consensus is 
regarding FORCEnet and to highlight areas that seem to 
require attention.  Additionally, by creating a FORCEnet 
framework from the several interpretations, it is hoped 
that the beginnings of a simplified tool will be created 
for programs to use to measure themselves against FORCEnet 
concepts and that individuals can use for self-education. 
By comparing JFN to the synthesized FORCEnet 
framework, the study should serve as a useful reference for 
determining the future path of JFN. 
 
7. Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter I is the background and organization of the 
thesis. 
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Chapter II describes the organizational 
interpretations of FORCEnet given by the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group (SSG), the 
FORCEnet Director (CNO N6/7)/FORCEnet Deputy Director and 
Warfare Sponsor (Director of Space, Information Warfare, 
Command and Control Division [CNO N61]), the FORCEnet 
Project Coordinator (Naval Network Warfare Command 
[NAVNETWARCOM]), and the FORCEnet Chief Engineer (Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command [SPAWAR]), in order to 
describe the concept as presently envisioned for the Naval 
services. 
Chapter III reconciles the various interpretations 
into a simple framework that can be used to evaluate 
existing naval systems for consistency with FORCEnet 
principles. 
Chapter IV briefly describes the history and purpose 
of JFN, and its architecture as presently fielded, in order 
to compare it with the Chapter III framework. 
Chapter V provides conclusions regarding the degree of 
organizational consensus regarding FORCEnet and a 
determination of how well JFN complies with and supports 
FORCEnet concepts. 
Chapter VI discusses recommendations and possible 


























The scope and implications of FORCEnet are not yet 
widely understood or well appreciated because of the 
complexity of the concepts involved and the difficulty of 
realizing fundamental change in a large organization.  This 
chapter explores FORCEnet by first examining its role in 
the Navy’s larger transformational vision, and then 
reviewing the understanding of major Navy organizations 
responsible for turning the vision into reality. 
 
A. SEA POWER 21 – THE CONTEXT FOR FORCENET 
Sea Power 21 is the Navy’s vision for how it will 
organize, integrate and transform to take advantage of the 
opportunities and meet the challenges that have emerged 
since the end of the Cold War and the reordering of global 
power relationships.  Sea Power 21 foresees using 
innovative concepts and technology to integrate sea, land, 
air, space and cyberspace more completely in order to 
project power globally when and where required.2 
Previous naval strategies concentrated on well-
organized regional threats, but the events of September 11, 
2001 shifted and broadened the focus of future missions; 
terrorist and criminal organizations with global reach, 
failed states in unstable regions, nations at war in key 
regions and transnational instability.  These types of 
threats have proved to be extremely difficult to deal with 
in traditional ways.  In order to meet these newer types of 
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2 Clark, p. 33.  At this writing and the time of the article, Admiral 
Clark was the Chief of Naval Operations. 
threats, in addition to its traditional missions of sea 
control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic 
sealift and forward presence, the Navy must expand its 
striking power, develop information dominance and adopt 
other transformational ways of doing business.3 
Sea Power 21 has three main concepts:  Sea Shield, 
extending defensive assurance around the world; Sea Strike, 
projecting precise and persistent offensive power from the 
sea; and Sea Basing, increasing operational independence 
and support for the force.  This triad is enabled by 
FORCEnet, which integrates warriors, sensors, networks, 
command and control, platforms and weapons into a fully 
netted combat force.  Sea Power 21 will take advantage of 
American asymmetric strengths of expanding computing power, 
systems integration, a powerful industrial base and an 
extraordinarily capable population.  Sea Power 21 also 
includes a Global Concept of Operations that reorganizes 
the distribution and firepower of the fleet to take 
advantage of increased capabilities.4  The Global Concept of 
Operations will not be discussed in this thesis. 
 
1. Sea Shield 
The principle of Sea Shield is to provide a layered 
defense to protect the United States, sustain access to 
contested littoral areas, and project a defensive umbrella 
over coalition and joint forces ashore in distant theaters.  
Sea Shield includes traditional naval missions such as sea 
control off of hostile coasts and maritime defense of the 
                     3 Clark, p. 33. 
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4 Clark, pp. 33-34. 
United States, in addition to complicated missions that 
have not been attempted before, such as projecting defense 
deep inland against cruise and ballistic missile threats.5 
More specifically, Sea Shield addresses Theater Air 
and Missile Defense, Sea and Littoral Control and Extended 
Homeland Defense.  Theater Air and Missile Defense is a 
critical component of Sea Shield, requiring the emergence 
of advanced network-based operations coupled with high 
levels of weapon system technology, both seamlessly fused 
to produce a single integrated air picture available to all 
elements of the force.  In addition to traditional threats, 
Sea and Littoral Control addresses threats such as small, 
fast surface combatants, modern ultra-quiet submarines and 
various types of mines.  It envisions a network of large 
numbers of distributed sensors and weapons aggregated to 
permit collaborative mission planning and tactical 
decision-making.  Extended Homeland Defense relies on the 
other components of Sea Shield to protect the United 
States.  Additionally, it envisions sharing information 
with other services and agencies to extend the United 
States security boundary much further seaward.  This 
involves integrating naval forces with joint, interagency 
and civil efforts to a far greater degree than today.6 
 
2. Sea Strike 
Sea Strike focuses on the offensive.  Though delivery 
of ordnance is a critical function, the concept of Sea 
                     5 Bucchi and Mullen, pp. 56-57.  At this writing and the time of the 
article, Vice Admiral Bucchi was Commander, THIRD Fleet and Vice 
Admiral Mullen was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, 
Requirements and Assessments. 
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6 Bucchi and Mullen, pp. 57-59. 
Strike is naval power projection that takes advantage of 
C5ISR (command, control, communications, computers, combat 
systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), 
precision, stealth, information and joint strike to close 
the sensor-to-shooter gap and apply persistent, high tempo 
force against the spectrum of an enemy’s assets.7  
Information operations will be a fundamental part of Sea 
Strike in order to help control crisis escalation and shape 
the battlefield before the start of hostilities. 
Sea Strike also envisions the development of updated 
or entirely new sensors and systems netted to provide 
precise targeting data, intelligence and control to every 
level of command.  Long dwell time unmanned air, surface 
and subsurface vehicles, new generations of naval weapons 
and platforms, and the ability to engage hundreds, or even 
thousands, of targets simultaneously are key aspects of Sea 
Shield. 
Finally, the long-range vision of Sea Strike includes 
the ability to fuse multiple sensors and systems 
automatically to build a strike picture.  Done effectively 
this will improve the sensor-to-decision maker-to-shooter 





                     7 Dawson and Nathman, p. 54.  At this writing and the time of the 
article, Vice Admiral Dawson was Commander, SECOND Fleet and Vice 
Admiral Nathman was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare 
Requirements and Program (N6/N7). 
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3. Sea Basing 
Sea Basing is the core of Sea Power 21.  It is about 
placing at sea, more than ever before, offensive and 
defensive firepower, maneuver forces, command and control 
and logistics.  It minimizes the need to build up forces 
and supplies ashore, reduces their vulnerability and 
enhances operational mobility.  It takes advantage of 
advanced sensor and communication systems, precision 
ordnance and weapons range to preposition joint assets 
where they are immediately usable  and most effective.  It 
seeks to exploit the operational shift in warfare from mass 
to precision and information, and to use the high 
percentage of the earth’s surface that is covered with 
water as a maneuver area to support joint forces.9 
The sea base is composed of many, distributed forces, 
including carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike 
groups, combat logistic force ships, maritime 
prepositioning force platforms and other high-speed support 
vessels that emerge in the future.  These forces are 
evolving to project more precise and persistent firepower 
at longer ranges, resulting in reduced weapon production, 
shipping, storage and employment.  The inherent operational 
mobility of the sea base also enables naval forces to 
threaten the enemy along the entire coast, severely 
restricting his options.10 
Seamless joint communication is required for maximum 
Sea Basing effectiveness.  It must fully integrate joint, 
                     9 Hanlon and Moore, p. 80.  At this writing and the time of the 
article, Lieutenant General Hanlon was Commanding General, Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command and Vice Admiral Moore was Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4). 
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theater and national systems and be able to bring in 
allies, coalition partners and friends.  It must also reach 
other government agencies, civilian relief and 
international aid groups.  Communication systems designed 
to easily integrate other nations will simplify and 
encourage coalition building because it is politically and 
logistically easier for nations to contribute to a sea-
based effort than to commit land forces.11 
 
4. FORCEnet 
The elements of Sea Power 21 will rely on the fully 
networked, integrated and evolved concepts of FORCEnet to 
enable them to come together synergistically into an 
integrated whole.  To summarize, Sea Strike will rely on 
the situational awareness provided by persistent 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to 
sense the enemy and apply advanced decision aides and 
processes across a wide network to execute rapid, tightly 
coordinated and precise attacks.  Sea Shield will generate 
situational awareness from information drawn across the 
same network from joint military, interagency and coalition 
sources and integrated with similar decision aides to 
identify and eliminate threats far from the United States, 
locate and destroy restrictions to access to littoral 
waters and intercept missiles near their source.  Sea 
Basing will similarly consolidate widely distributed, but 
networked information sources to generate the situational 
awareness needed and the decision-aided, optimized flows to 
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sustain command and logistics afloat to ensure operational 
effectiveness and timely support.12 
FORCEnet envisions near-instantaneous collection, 
analysis and dissemination of information over seamless 
communication paths coupled with computer-driven decision 
aids to unify the perception of the battle space in the 
future.  When fully developed, this information superiority 
will be an asymmetric advantage that the United States can 
use to disperse its forces while focusing offensive and 
defensive firepower over large distances. 
FORECEnet implements the theory of network-centric 
warfare.  That theory is reflected in the previously stated 
CNO Strategic Studies Group definition of FORCEnet: 
…the operational construct and architectural 
framework for Naval Warfare in the Information 
Age which integrates Warriors, sensors, networks, 
command and control, platforms and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat force, scalable 
across the spectrum of conflict from seabed to 
space and from sea to land.13 
FORCEnet requires a network architecture that includes 
standard and universal protocols, common data packaging, 
seamless interoperability and strong security.  It will 
also provide a comprehensive network of sensors, analysis 
tools and decision aids to support all activities from 
combat to logistics and personnel development.  This common  
                     12 Mayo and Nathman, p. 42.  At this writing and the time of the 
article, Vice Admiral Mayo was Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command 
and Vice Admiral Nathman was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Warfare Requirements and Program (N6/N7). 
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understanding of the entire spectrum of activity will help 
forces to synchronize their actions to achieve the greatest 
impact. 
United States military successes in recent years have 
resulted, in part, from long-term investment in 
capabilities such as joint data links, space-based 
navigation systems, stand-off and precision weapons, better 
strike and fighter aircraft and highly trained and well-
educated forces.  These are among the principle elements of 
Sea Shield, Sea Strike, Sea Basing and FORCEnet.  FORCEnet 
will strive to take these and other current, planned and 
conceptual capabilities to a higher level of integration 
and effectiveness.  Data streams shared by all services 
will be compiled into a common operational picture, 
multiple sensors will be fully integrated to share 
information, joint, multi-agency and coalition analysis 
cells will be available to translate information and 
rapidly disseminate the knowledge, and effective decision 
aids will become commonplace.14 
FORCEnet will achieve these goals by acquiring 
information, sharing information and exploiting information 
more effectively than in the past.  To acquire information, 
the FORCEnet goal is to achieve comprehensive and 
persistent, multi-spectral sensing that integrates naval, 
joint and national sea, ground, air and space systems.  
These sensors may be on manned ships, submarines and 
aircraft, or unmanned air, surface and subsurface 
platforms.  They would include temporary, expeditionary, 
sensor grids of many forms, possibly including submarine-
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launched-to-space sensor or communication packages directly 
controlled by a local commander. 
Information sharing will go beyond simply exchanging 
track and engagement data.  FORCEnet envisions an 
environment in which all relevant data is available to a 
user including operational, tactical, logistic, political, 
economic and cultural data that affects a mission.  This 
requires full integration with the joint forces and with 
other governmental and non-governmental agencies.15 
Effectively exploiting such large amounts of 
information will change command and control and the flow of 
data.  Instantaneous and persistent information is 
perishable; therefore, collection, analysis, dissemination, 
decision-making and execution processes will change 
accordingly.  Among FORCEnet’s biggest challenges is to 
develop methods and processes to bring the right 
information to the decision-maker at the right time.  This 
requires more than technological solutions.  Processes and 
systems must be engineered to include the human in order to 
take advantage of an educated user’s capabilities 
efficiently.  The decision-maker must be able to 
comfortably retrieve and absorb the anticipated amounts of 
information and knowledge that FORCEnet envisions. 
The ultimate goal of the increased analysis, decision 
and display capabilities envisioned by FORECEnet is to 
increase the tempo and scope of command awareness such that 
the commander can predict what will happen next and thus 
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preempt an adversary’s actions.  This is how FORCEnet turns 
knowledge into action and information into power.16 
 
5. Achieving Sea Power 21 
The transformational intent of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, 
Sea Basing and FORCEnet cannot be met by the measured 
acquisition and training processes optimized for the Cold 
War environment.  Organizational change to support the Sea 
Power 21 vision is described in the Sea Trail, Sea Warrior 
and Sea Enterprise concepts.  These are discussed below, 
followed by a discussion of the  top-level FORCEnet 
delivery organization and strategy. 
 
a. Sea Trial 
Sea Trial is the framework for a continual 
process of rapid concept and technology development 
intended to deliver new and improved capabilities to the 
fleet as rapidly as possible in a reformed acquisition 
environment.  It incorporates the spiral development 
process to speed the deployment and improvement of 
promising concepts through wargaming, rapid prototyping and 
fleet-based experimentation.17 
The Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) is the 
Executive Agent for Sea Trial.  Commander, SECOND Fleet 
(C2F) and Commander, THIRD Fleet (C3F) are the operational 
agents for development of Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea 
Basing capabilities, reaching throughout the military and 
beyond to coordinate promising concepts and technology.  
                     16 Mayo and Nathman, p. 45. 
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Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM) 
fills this same role for FORCEnet.  The Systems Commands 
and Program Executive Offices are integral to bringing 
those concepts and technologies to reality.  The Navy 
Warfare Development Command (NWDC) coordinates Sea Trial 
and reports directly to CFFC.  NWDC works closely with the 
fleets, academia and other technology development centers 
to bring promising concepts and technologies forward for 
testing and experimentation. 
 
b. Sea Warrior 
Sea Warrior is the personnel, training and  
education component necessary for Sea Power 21 to succeed.  
The Chief of Naval Personnel and Commander, Naval Education 
and Training Command (CNETC, formerly Chief of Navy 
Education and Training [CNET]) are the leaders in this 
area.  Their goal is to develop the highly skilled, 
motivated and optimally employed professionals required in 
the future.  Optimal manning will change along with new 
technology, platforms and weapons.  Smaller crews will 
become more efficient with these changes, but they must be 
superbly trained and educated to be effective.18 
Sea Power 21 envisions a life-long continuum of 
education and training to match and support advances in 
technology, systems and platforms.  Professional and 
personal development, leadership and military education 
will benefit from information technology improvements.  
Trainers and simulators, skills training, mentoring 
techniques, performance measurement and counseling will 
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become more effective.  The personnel distribution system 
will become more responsive, interactive and incentivized 
to support more informed career decisions.  The “goal is to 
create a Navy in which all Sailors-active and reserve, 
afloat and ashore-are optimally assessed, trained, and 
assigned so that they can contribute their fullest to 
mission accomplishment.”19 
 
c. Sea Enterprise 
Sea Enterprise is lead by the Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations (VCNO) and is the organizational vision for 
recapitalizing the Navy.  To fulfill the vision of Sea 
Power 21, Cold War-era platforms, weapons, sensors and 
networks must be modernized or replaced with systems and 
equipment that are more capable.  The Systems Commands and 
the Fleet will also work to refine requirements and realign 
organizations.  Sea Enterprise will consider best practices 
from industry to reduce overhead, streamline processes and 
substitute technology for manpower.  Legacy systems and 
platforms will be considered for retirement and inter-
service integration will be pursed to maximize savings. 
Sound business practices will be adopted to 
provide the best return on available resources.  Executive 
business management, finance and information technology 
education for the leadership is central to an increase in 
efficiency.  This education and training will also extend 
to the lowest levels to develop a culture of productivity 
and effectiveness for the future.20 
                     19 Clark, p. 40. 
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d. FORCEnet 
Realizing FORCEnet will require strong leadership 
and considerable investment of resources.  The Director of 
FORCEnet is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Warfare Requirements and Programs (CNO N6/7).  The FORCEnet 
Warfare Sponsor is the Director of Space, Information 
Warfare, Command and Control Division (CNO N61).  The 
FORCEnet Type Commander and Project Coordinator is the 
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM).  
The FORCEnet Chief Engineer is the Commander, Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  Additionally, 
intellectual investment will be continually provided by the 
Fleet, the Naval War College (NWC), the Navy Warfare 
Development Command (NWDC), the other systems commands and 
the Office of Naval Research (ONR).21 
The priority actions to begin the implementation 
of FORECEnet are; establishing open architecture systems 
and standards to allow rapid upgrades and integration; 
building common databases to widely share information; 
implementing standard user interfaces; and establishing 
portals to allow users to pull data from common servers.22 
These early actions are intended to support the 
following FORCEnet objectives: 
• Enhance sensing, connectivity and decision- 
making.  This requires filling capability gaps to 
provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance; emphasizing rapidly deployable, 
distributed and networked unmanned systems; 
enhancing communication systems to optimize 
                     21 Mayo and Nathman, p. 45. 
  23
22 Mayo and Nathman, p. 45. 
bandwidth and satellite resources; tailoring 
command and control systems to suit the new 
architecture; and making network infrastructures 
dynamic and interoperable. 
• Expand joint, interagency and coalition 
interoperability.  FORCEnet is intended to 
transcend organizational boundaries to integrate 
joint, coalition and interagency platforms, 
systems, networks and weapons, as well as non-
governmental and international agencies when 
necessary. 
• Invest in intra-theater capabilities.  
Communication paths frequently follow out-of-
theater paths to in-theater destinations.  This 
is inefficient and inconsistent with Sea Basing.  
Intra-theater capacity and capability will have 
to grow to optimize global resources as higher 
capacity systems emerge. 
• Focus on the “warrior” in FORCEnet development.  
Improved human-system integration is central to 
realizing the potential that FORCEnet can bring 
to greater situational awareness, self-
synchronized execution and faster speed of 
decision. 
• Experiment, innovate, integrate and implement.  
The iterative nature of Sea Trial is the only 
viable option for implementing a concept as 
comprehensive and transformational as FORCEnet.23 
Developing FORCEnet will be challenging because 
of the depth of integration envisioned.  Since there is a 
better general understanding today of the potential that 
information technologies hold for transforming processes, 
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B. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (CNO) STRATEGIC STUDIES 
GROUP (SSG) 
 
1. The Strategic Studies Group 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies 
Group (SSG) was established in 1981 at the Naval War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island to conduct conceptual 
research in the areas of national security and military 
strategy.  Today, the SSG’s sole mission is the generation 
of revolutionary naval warfare concepts.  It explores 
innovations in naval war fighting, develops war fighting 
concepts, applies possible technologies, establishes 
criteria for evaluating these concepts in operational 
experiments and recommends actions directly to the CNO.  
The SSG is most appropriately characterized as an 
“Operational Research and Concept Development Center.”24 
The SSG is composed of fellows nominated from the 
Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, along with scientists 
and analysts nominated from the Navy’s systems commands and 
laboratories.  Only the CNO tasks the SSG and the SSG 
reports directly to the CNO.  The SSG works closely with 
the CNO’s staff, NWC, NWDC, Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), ONR, systems commands, Joint and other service 
staffs, DOD and other agencies, governmental and non-
governmental organizations, and foreign and private 
interests on its mission. 
Over the course of several years, the SSG conceived 
much of the framework for Sea Power 21. 
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The SSG makes certain assumptions in its research in 
order to provide a baseline for its analysis and 
conclusions.  The assumptions relevant to FORCEnet are 
that: 
• There is an inherent institutional resistance to 
change within the Navy. 
• The Department of Defense is proceeding down a 
path toward Net-Centric Warfare; the theory of 
warfare in the Information Age 
• Major program realignment is possible beyond the 
near-term Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 
cycle (one to two years). 
• FORCEnet will apply across all naval warfare 
mission areas. 
• FORCEnet will connect to the Global Information 
Grid (GIG). 
• FORCEnet will require a 21st Century Warrior who 
can operate in a technologically advanced, highly 
adaptable, human-centric system. 
 
3. The SSG Architecture Development Process 
SSG XXI used previous SSG research and a system 
engineering-like approach to decompose FORCEnet by letting 
its form follow its functions.  The purpose was to create a 
coherent, though general architecture to guide future 
investment, and identify gaps requiring new technology, in 
an effort to speed up the evolution of FORCEnet in support 
of the Sea Power 21 framework. 
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The process repeatedly selected naval missions and 
assigned the attributes necessary to conduct that mission 
(detect, classify, report, engage, etc.).  Then the factors 
(Warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, 
platforms and weapons) needed to conduct that particular 
mission were identified.  The attributes the factors must 
possess to do the mission (manned, unmanned, organic, 
national, etc.) were collected.  Capabilities that the 
factors need to have could then be generated (see Table 
1.).  Specific existing systems could then be identified to 
provide that capability, with missing systems becoming 
obvious. 
 
4. The FORCEnet Factors 
The recently completed SSG XXI gave the following 
definition of FORCEnet, slightly modified from previous 
years and repeated here for reference: 
FORCEnet is the operational construct and 
architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the 
Information Age which integrates Warriors, 
sensors, networks, command and control, platforms 
and weapons into a networked, distributed combat 
force, scalable across the spectrum of conflict 
from seabed to space and from sea to land.25 
In this definition, the full potential of FORCEnet is not 
achieved by the simple combination of the six factors, but 
by the possibilities that result from the synthesis of all 
of the components.  FORCEnet as envisioned by the SSG will 
create an environment in which all of these elements 
working together will allow war fighters to discover new 
possibilities that cannot necessarily be foreseen today. 
The six SSG FORCEnet factors (Warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, platforms and weapons) have 
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p. xvii. 
been adopted in whole into the Sea Power 21 framework.  
They will not be discussed again here.  Of interest to this 
work are the characteristics used by the SSG in its process 
of bridging from conceptual and operational architectures 
to a system architecture. 
 
5. Attributes of the FORCEnet Factors 
SSG XX described the following general attributes of 
the FORCEnet factors to guide the development of the 
FORCEnet architecture.  They should be: 
• Human-centric to take advantage of the best of 
humans and computers through automation and 
improved human-computer interfaces, where 
products are designed to work for the operator, 
not the operator for the computer. 
• Open, such as plug and play, allowing the system 
to be connected easily to equipment made by 
different manufacturers.  Open architecture also 
encourages the use of off-the-shelf components. 
• Distributed to enhance survivability and increase 
computational power.  The entire network can 
become the computer as the Navy harnesses the 
untapped power of many networks in collaboration. 
• Heterogeneous to allow distributed networked 
systems to run different operating systems or 
protocols.  Heterogeneity reduces the 
vulnerability of having just one operating system 
or just one software.  Many different protocols 
and operating systems, operating simultaneously, 
reduce the ability of an enemy to successfully 
attack the network. 
• Secure to provide protection from internal and 
external threats.  Improved encryption, low 
probability-of-intercept transmissions, and 
intrusion detection software are important 
approaches to maintain the security of the 
network. 
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• Robust to reduce the vulnerability to attack.  
Robustness is achieved with a hybrid system using 
the best combination of decentralized and 
centralized links, and self-healing, self-
hardening enhancements to keep FORCEnet 
operational continuously. 
• Interoperable within the maritime force and 
throughout joint, interagency and coalition 
systems. 
• Scalable in size, sophistication and function.  
FORCEnet must scale for use from the individual 
Warrior to the Joint Task Force Commander, and 
from forward presence or humanitarian relief to 
major theater war.  Scalability enables a rapid 
joint response across the spectrum of operations 
providing flexibility and adaptability. 
• Ubiquitous is a term describing the third wave of 
computing.  The first wave was many people per 
computer.  The second wave was one computer for 
one person.  The third wave will be many 
computers per person. 
• Collaborative giving the value and revolutionary 
capability of FORCEnet to the fully netted force.  
The synergy of multiple sensors sharing 
information or Warriors sharing knowledge in an 
environment characterized by the attributes of 
FORCEnet is of tremendous operational value.26 
 
6. Capabilities of the FORCEnet Factors 
SSG XXI established the capabilities that each of the 
factors should have, in order to then identify existing or 
future systems to support the capabilities.  The factors 
should have the capability for: 
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Table 1.   SSG FORCEnet Factors Capabilities.  
(After:  CNO SSG XXI, Accelerating FORCEnet-
Winning in the Information Age, p. 3-3.) 
 
7. Enabling Technologies of FORCEnet 
SSG XX also identified several commercial and 
military-specific technologies necessary to support 
FORCEnet capabilities. 
 
a. Commercial Technologies 
Since development of relevant commercial 
technologies will continue to be driven by private sector 
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market demand, the military must become proficient at 
quickly incorporating these technologies into its 
architecture.  These include: 
• Data fusion technologies that can merge various 
data and multiple databases to improve 
situational awareness.  This is not a common 
database found in one location, but a shared, 
distributed database available on demand to those 
with access. 
• Data mining technologies to bring information to 
the right person at the right time. 
• High computing density to create more processing 
capability packaged smaller, requiring less 
weight and power to support more sensors, 
processors and entities. 
• Bandwidth efficiency improvement through more low 
earth orbit satellites, optical pathways and 
advanced multiplexing 
• Human-computer interfaces such as speech 
recognition and synthesis, high fidelity, low 
error, ergonomic displays. 
• Advanced wireless devices to support connectivity 
through the last tactical mile. 
• Network security technologies such as biometric 
identification, dynamic firewalls and intrusion 
detection to reduce vulnerability and improve 
information assurance.27 
 
b. Military-Specific Technologies 
Some technologies necessary to FORCEnet are not 
available in the private sector or are not in high demand.  
These are areas where the DOD should invest its research 
and development resources. 
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• Advanced sensors of all types to support order of 
magnitude increases in detection capability 
across the entire spectrum. 
• Advanced antennas and arrays for multi-frequency 
and phased array technologies to support higher 
data rates and bandwidth for air, surface and 
subsurface sensing and communication. 
• Military-specific software agents to perform such 
tasks as automatic target recognition, course of 
action determination, unmanned autonomous vehicle 
control and other chores to reduce the workload 
on the Warrior. 
• Unmanned vehicles that can operate in combat in 
the absence of satellites to provide FORCEnet 
robustness and other mission support. 
• Dynamic ad-hoc networking technology such as 
peer-to-peer router and other software to allow 
Warriors, sensor and processors to seamlessly 
enter and depart the network. 
• Precise time technology improvement must continue 
in order to support widely distributed components 
conducting time-critical and long-range strike, 
multiple sensor data fusion and battlefield 
deconfliction. 
• Mobile laser communication systems can 
potentially carry multi-gigabits per second among 
nodes, providing secure links, high resistance to 
jamming and low probability of detection, in 
addition to possible weight and power 
advantages.28 
 
C. DIRECTOR OF FORCENET 
The Director of FORCEnet is the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (CNO 
N6/7).  The Director is responsible for leading Naval 
efforts to integrate C4I and network initiatives.  
                     
  32
28 SSG XX, FORCEnet and the 21st Century Warrior, pp. 2-6,7. 
Acquisition programs are being re-aligned under CNO (N6/7) 
to support this integration. 
The Deputy Director of FORCEnet and FORCEnet Warfare 
Sponsor is the Director of the Space, Information Warfare, 
Command and Control Division (CNO N61).  The Deputy 
Director is responsible for validation of FORCEnet 
requirements and aggregation of resources from among 
various Resource Sponsors to support FORCEnet development. 
 
1. FORECEnet Requirements Process 
FORCEnet is not an acquisition program.  It is an 
enterprise alignment and integration initiative to enable 
capabilities and efficiencies not otherwise possible under 
the existing structure of individual stove-piped programs 
and efforts.  FORCEnet will potentially touch every Naval 
acquisition program.29  Since FORCEnet is intended to guide 
acquisition, a capabilities-based approach was adopted for 
requirements generation to identify potential bottlenecks, 
overlaps and duplications between systems across the Naval 
Structure. 
The top-level FORCEnet requirements were generated in 
a process that created operational concepts that flowed 
down from the National and Defense Strategies through the 
Naval Transformation Strategy (NTR) and Sea Power 21.  The 
operational concepts were validated in a process of 
experimentation and wargaming.  The capabilities needed to 
support those operational concepts were analyzed across 
available material and non-material solutions.  If a 
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capability warranted a materiel solution, a Fleet-validated 
requirement was generated. 
 
2. Top-Level FORCEnet Requirements 
The FORCEnet requirements process generated the 
following six required capabilities that FORCEnet must have 
to satisfy the operational requirements set for it.  
FORCEnet must provide: 
 
a. Expeditionary, Multi-Tiered Sensor and 
Weapon Information 
The expeditionary, multi-tiered sensor and 
weapons grid capability uses a full spectrum of manned and 
unmanned vehicles, platforms, sensors and weapons to 
provides the Force Commander with what is needed to locate 
targets and attack them across the depth and breadth of a 
theater-sized battle space.  Sensors must determine their 
position, time and movement at the precise time they are 
reporting their target or other intelligence information.  
The time and position information of the tracks in the grid 
must be properly linked to a reference frame with known 
error and confidence levels for it to be accurately 
understood, represented and fused with other information.  
Many modern weapons are also dependent on precise time and 
position for effective operation. 
 
b. Distributed, Collaborative Command and 
Control 
This is the capability to collaboratively manage 
land, air, sea and space operational forces in time space 
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and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power and 
minimize risk to one’s own forces.  This activity ensures 
all elements of the operational force, including supported 
agencies’ and nations’ forces, are efficiently and safely 
employed to maximize their combat effects beyond the sum of 
their individual capabilities. 
 
c. Dynamic, Multi-Path and Survivable Networks 
This is the requirement to provide data and 
information flow seamlessly and transparently to the war 
fighter across a fault tolerant, adaptable, self-
organizing, holistically engineered, continuously available 
network.  The data and information flows across a wide 
range of transmission paths in an interoperable manner with 
naval, joint, coalition, civil and law enforcement 
agencies.  Platforms, vehicles and applications are able to 
communicate freely and autonomously with other elements of 
the architecture making the existence and functions of the 
underlying network transparent to the war fighter. 
 
d. Adaptive, Automated Decision Aids 
These decision aides support war fighter decision 
making by providing recommended courses of action that are 
adaptive and based upon knowledge of the operational 
context, commander’s intent, rules of engagement, order of 





e. Human-Centric Integration 
The requirement for human-centric integration is 
to enhance the ability of the war fighter to multi-task 
through all phases of warfare by developing improved human-
computer interfaces that take advantage of the best 
qualities of humans and computers. 
 
f. Information Weapons 
Information weapons integrate the use of military 
deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare and 
physical destruction.  These are mutually supported by 
intelligence in order to deny information, and influence, 
degrade or destroy enemy information, information–based 
processes and information systems. 
The attributes of these requirements will be discussed 
in detail in the FORCEnet Analysis section below. 
 
3. FORCENET Interoperability 
A fundamental FORCEnet objective is the development of 
a Naval networking infrastructure and integrated 
applications suite with full interoperability among the 
service components, joint task force elements and allied 
and coalition forces.  This goal will be pursued by the 
establishment of high-level architecture tenets and 
standards as part of the FORCEnet “blueprint,” supported by 
a cross-program systems engineering effort under the 
FORCEnet Chief Engineer (COMSPAWRSYSCOM) and enforced by 
the Director of FORCEnet to ensure that design decisions 
made by component programs are consistent with the FORCEnet 
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blueprint.  The blueprint will be based on joint and 
industry standards, and is being coordinated with Army, Air 
Force, Coast Guard, Joint and allied transformation 
initiatives. 
To the maximum extent feasible, development of a 
dynamic, multi-path, survivable FORCEnet Network 
Information Infrastructure (NII) will take advantage of 
commercial technology and networks by using open-system 
standards and protocols.  The Transport Control Protocol 
(TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP) will be the common 
standard to move data seamlessly around the DOD Global 
Information Grid and, by extension, FORCEnet.  For 
applications where military-specific capabilities (such as 
anti-jam, low probability of intercept, and spread-spectrum 
waveforms) are required, military products will be adapted 
to interface with the overall architecture.30 
 
4. Integrating Systems into FORCEnet 
The FORCEnet NII is the foundation for integrating 
current and future systems into FORCEnet.  It fundamentally 
uses an open architecture approach that mandates the 
separation of the information infrastructure from sensor, 
navigation and weapon systems, as well as applications 
(command and control, track correlation, target/weapon 
pairing, etc.).  The FORCEnet Open Architecture (OA) 
initiative will support the NII and incorporate common 
engineering, information, protocol, computing and interface 
standards across various computing environments and 
platforms.  OA requires thorough systems design and 
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engineering to implement non-proprietary specifications for 
interfaces, services and supporting formats across all war 
fighting functions.  Properly engineered and partitioned 
hardware and software components will be usable cross a 
wide range of systems and platforms.  OA systems are 
portable and scalable, requiring minimal system changes as 
warfare requirements or commercial computing technologies 
change.  OA means that FORCEnet compliant systems and 
applications will be able to communicate across the 
infrastructure allowing broad and rapid information 
exchange and assimilation.31 
 
5. FORCEnet Measures 
The Deputy Director of FORCEnet’s FORCEnet 
Requirements Branch, CNO (N61F), heads a FORCEnet Analysis 
Team (AT).  The AT is a virtual team composed of 
acquisition and war fighter representatives, along with 
subject matter experts.  The AT is responsible for creating 
common definitions of the FORCEnet requirements and the 
attributes of the requirements.  These evolving attributes 
and measures provide guidance for the rest of Navy for 
further architecture development and acquisition. 
The common definitions of the six FORCEnet top-level 
requirements were stated above.  The table below provides 
the current attributes and their measurement definitions 
for each of the top-level requirements.  Strict adherence 
at all levels to the measurement criteria as they evolve is 
how FORCEnet will develop into the envisioned architecture. 
 
                     
  38
31 Director of FORCEnet, p.11-12. 
1. Provide expeditionary, multi-tiered sensor and weapon 
information 
Attribute Notional Measurement Definition 
Accuracy Correspondence with ground truth. 
Consistency Degree of lack of ambiguity with previous 
information. 
Completeness Percentage of ground truth relevant and 
necessary for ongoing task 
Precision Error and confidence level for time and 
position information compared to a standard 
reference. 
Timeliness Degree to which currency matches what is 
needed. 
 
2.  Conduct distributed, collaborative Command and Control 




Degree to which the different individual 
mental models of the situation are 









Percentage of nodes that can retrieve 
various sets of information. 
Understandability Degree to which information is easy to 
use. 
Precision Error and confidence level for time and 
position information compared to a 
standard reference. 







3.  Provide dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks 
Attribute Notional Measurement Definition 
Capacity Throughput. 
Reach Percentage of nodes that can communicate in 
desired access modes, information formats 
and applications. 
Connectivity Percentage of time that all required nodes 
are connected to the network. 
Information 
Assurance 
Extent to which nodes support the assurance 
of information in the areas of privacy, 




Measures of jitter, packet loss and latency.
Timeliness Degree to which currency matches what is 
needed. 
Agility Extent to which the network can maintain QOS 
in response to environmental changes 
(incorporates robustness, responsiveness, 
flexibility, innovativeness and 
adaptativeness). 
Robustness Number of differing conditions/environments 
over which the network is capable of 
operating at a given level of effectiveness.
Effectiveness of the network across varying 
levels of attack/degradation. 
Number of task/missions that the network is 
capable of doing at a given level of 
effectiveness. 
Responsiveness The timeliness of a response to an 
environmental change. 
Flexibility Number of options for responding to an 
environmental change. 
Compatibility of different responses. 
Innovativeness Number of novel responses developed and 
implemented. 
Adaptiveness Number and timeliness of changes to network 
structure and processes. 
 
4.  Provide adaptive, automated decision aids 
Attribute Notional Measurement Definition 
Robustness Degree to which decision aides support 
decision making across a range of 
situations and degradation conditions. 
Responsiveness Degree to which decision aides support 
decision making which is relevant and 
timely. 
Innovativeness Degree to which decision aides support 
decision making that reflects novel ways to 
perform known tasks. 
Adaptability Degree to which decision aides support a 
decision making process with the 
flexibility to alter decision making in 
response to the evolution of the battle 
space landscape. 
Consistency Extent to which decision aides support 
decision making that is internally 
consistent with prior understanding and 
decisions. 
Currency Extent to which decision aides support 
decision making that minimizes latency. 
Precision Error and confidence level for time and 
position information compared to a standard 
reference. 
Fitness for Use Relative quality in reference to criteria 
that are determined by the situation. 
Appropriateness Extent to which decision aides support 
decisions that are consistent with existing 
understanding, command intent and values. 
Completeness Extent to which decision aides support 
relevant decisions that encompass the 
necessary: 
-Depth: range of actions and contingencies 
included; 
-Breadth: range of force elements included; 
-Time: range of time horizons included. 
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5.  Provide human-centric integration 
Attribute Notional Measurement Definition 
Competence Distribution of the members’ knowledge, 
skills, abilities and attitudes. 
Trust Extent to which members are willing to rely 
on one another. 
Confidence Extent to which members have expectations 
of the reliability of the organization. 
Size Number of team members involved adequate to 
support the mission. 
Experience Degree to which team members have 
interacted in the past on the same task. 
Diversity Degree to which team members are 
heterogeneous or homogeneous across 
exogenous variables:  experience, age, 
gender, etc. 
Autonomy Extent to which organization is externally 
or self-directed. 
Structure Number of layers of authority, and 
functional differentiation effectiveness. 
Interdependence Extent to which members depend on one 
another for resources. 
Cooperation Extent to which members are willing and 
able to work together. 
Efficiency Extent to which members use one another’s 
resources to minimize cost and maximize 
benefits. 
Synchronization Extent to which organization is conflicted, 
deconflicted or synergistic. 
Engagement Extent to which all members actively and 
continuously participate. 





6.  Provide information weapons 
Attribute Notional Measurement Definition 
Lethality Extent of capability to precisely deliver 
desired Non-Kinetic (NK) Information 
Operations (IO) effects. 
Coverage Extent of capability to accomplish IO 
effects. 
Persistence Extent of capability to sustain IO effects. 
Timeliness Extent of capability to deliver desired NK 
IO effects at a desired time. 
Survivability Extent of capability to avoid enemy threats, 
counter ISR and employ IO techniques to 
reduce targeting of adversary kinetic 
systems allowing increased secure 
maneuvering by ASMD/Deny ISR/SEAD/Networks. 
Table 2.   FORCEnet Capability Attributes and 
Measures.  (After:  Director of FORCEnet, pp. E-3 
to E-7.) 
 
D. FORCEnet PROJECT COORDINATOR 
The FORCEnet Project Coordinator is the Commander, 
Naval Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM).  NAVNETWARCOM 
is responsible for validation of Information Technology, 
Information Operations, Space, and related execution year 
resource realignments, and for coordinating FORCEnet fleet 
implementation and related Sea Trial experimentation with 
the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC).  NAVNETWARCOM 
is also an agent for Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) 
to generate the Integrated Priority List (IPL) for fleet 
operational requirements. 
 
1. FORCEnet Architecture 
In addition to the above duties, NAVNETWARCOM is 
primarily responsible for the operational view of the 
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developing FORCEnet architecture.32  As such, it is starting 
the process of defining the capabilities to support the 
FORCEnet requirements stated by CNO N6/N7.  NAVNETWARCOM 
has also stated the following additional characteristics of 
FORCEnet: 
• FORCEnet is 
• Foundation and catalyst for Sea Power 21.  
It is the enabler for Sea Power 21.  It is 
the glue for Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea 
Basing. 
• Effort focused on the Human element.  21st 
Century Warrior. 
• Integration and alignment effort involving 
experimentation, modeling and simulation, 
war games, prototype development and 
analytical, defendable roadmaps. 
• Requirements effort that looks across all 
programs and will evolve as technologies 
allow. 
• Means to accelerate speed and accuracy of 
decision at every level of command. 
• Robustly networked sensors, decision aids, 
weapons, warriors and supporting systems. 
• Integration of all force elements throughout 
the battle space. 
• Synchronized battle space ISR tasking, 
processing, exploitation and dissemination. 
• FORCEnet is not 
• A Program of Record. 
• A box or system. 
• Just a network.33 
 
                     32 Mayo, slide 6. 
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2. Capabilities Required by FORCEnet 
Sea Power 21 presents the three fundamental concepts 
that lie at the center the Navy’s continued operational 
effectiveness.  They have been discussed previously and are 
Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing.  FORCEnet is the 
overarching effort to integrate warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, platforms and weapons into a 
fully netted combat force to support the three pillars. 
To support Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing 
FORCEnet must have the following top-level capabilities: 
 
• Expeditionary, multi-tiered, sensor and weapon 
information. 
• Distributed, collaborative command and control. 
• Dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks. 
• Adaptive, automated decision aids. 
• Human-centric integration. 
• Information weapons. 
These top-level requirements have been defined in 
previous sections.  NAVNETWARCOM has also identified and 
defined the capabilities needed to support the top-level 
FORCEnet requirements.  Appendix A describes these next 
level capabilities in detail. 
 
3. Capabilities Provided by FORCEnet 
FORCEnet will provide increasing capability to the 
three pillars as it develops.  These are the capabilities 
that FORCEnet will ultimately provide and that they should 
use in their architectural development efforts. 
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a. Capabilities Supporting Sea Strike 
• Knowledge dominance by enabling persistent 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
that will be converted into action by a full 
array of Sea Strike options. 
• Information superiority combined with enhanced 
decision aids and flexible strike options will 
result in time-sensitive targeting with far 
greater speed and accuracy. 
• Expanded situational awareness will put massed 
forces at risk for adversaries. 
• Information operations, to include electronic 
warfare, psychological operations, computer 
network attack, computer network defense, 
operations security, and military deception will 
mature. 
• Fully integrated naval aviation force packages 
that include Marine squadrons embarked on 
carriers and amphibious ships. 
• Significantly improved contributions of naval 
surveillance and reconnaissance assets to joint 
battle space awareness will be. 
• Full connectivity to an early in-theater backbone 
for a powerful grid of national, joint and sea-
based sensors. 
• Enhanced national and joint collection systems 
that enable forward-deployed forces to make use 
of timely intelligence information. 
• Improved flow of information from organic 
intelligence and surveillance sensors to tactical 
controllers. 
• Rapid relay of engagement assistance via improved 
data communications will provide shooters the 
information they need to quickly locate and 
strike the targets. 
• Defense in depth protection to ensure that 
networks are available, reliable and resistant to 
disruption or corruption. 
 
  46
b. Capabilities Supporting Sea Shield 
• The ability to combine naval track data with that 
from other services in a Single Integrated Air 
Picture to produce advances in tactical decision 
speed and accuracy at extended ranges. 
• The linking of sea-based interceptor missiles to 
a network of space and airborne sensors combined 
with a highly responsive command and control 
system. 
• The ability to defeat enemy anti-access 
capabilities through the development of netted 
distributed sensors and improved command and 
control with decision aids. 
• The building of a common undersea picture by 
networking widely distributed sensors, command 
elements, platforms and weapons. 
• MCM operations through the deployment of 
networked sensors, command elements and weapons. 
• Distributed weapons coordination through 
deployment of an expeditionary, multi-tiered 
sensor and weapons grid. 
• Anti-terrorism collaboration with Coast Guard, 
civil and law enforcement agencies. 
• Defense in depth protection to ensure that 
networks are available, reliable and resistant to 
disruption or corruption. 
 
c. Capabilities Supporting Sea Basing 
• A single, fully netted force to greatly enhance 
the speed and effectiveness of expeditionary 
warfare from the sea. 
• Enroute collaborative planning and rehearsal 
capabilities that will be enhanced by distributed 
network tools. 
• Collaboration with allied and coalition forces. 
• Robust, survivable and flexible command and 
control with global connectivity. 
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• Reach-back access and distribution of logistics 
information that is critical to sustaining the 
war fighter in-theater. 
• Defense in depth protection to ensure that 
networks are available, reliable and resistant to 
disruption or corruption34 
 
E. FORCEnet CHIEF ENGINEER (CHENG) 
The FORCENET Chief Engineer (CHENG) is the Commander, 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  SPAWAR 
is also the FORCEnet Chief Assessor and the C4I CHENG to 
the other System Commands (SYSCOMS).  SPAWAR is responsible 
for assessing overlaps, interoperability, technical and 
schedule risk and cost, for defining FORCEnet architectures 
and standards and for integrating the FORCEnet efforts of 
the SYSCOMS.  SPAWAR is beginning to coordinate with the 
other SYSCOMS via a “Virtual SYSCOM” agreement, and with 
SYSCOM and ASN (RD&A) CHENG’s through a “Council of 
CHENG’s.” 
 
1. SPAWAR Architecture Development Process 
The FORCEnet Chief Engineer is beginning to establish 
a set of functional, system and application requirements 
using a developing set of FORCEnet architectures, standards 
and protocols.  Together, these will form the FORCEnet 
“blueprint” and will provide a basis for validating that 
systems are “FORCEnet-compliant.” 
The figure below illustrates the preferred process 
that will be used.  It is iterative, but because the  
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34 FORCEnet Project Coordinator, FORCEnet Initial Capabilities 
Document (Preliminary Draft),  pp. 17-19. 
concept of operations (CONOPS) and operational views have 
not been well developed yet, only parts of the cycle are 
being used thus far. 
 
 
Figure 1.   FORCEnet Development Process.  (From:  
SPAWAR Brief for CNO Executive Panel on 11 March 
03.) 
 
2. SPAWAR FORCEnet Architecture 
The SPAWAR FORCEnet Architecture is in the draft stage 
of development.  As a result, it is mostly a collection of 
the concepts, characteristics and guidance provided by 
higher echelon organizations.  The exceptions to this rule  
  49
are the Assumptions and Constraints, Findings and Proposed 
Measures of Effectiveness, which will be discussed in 
detail below. 
The architectures stated purpose is to: 
• Provide a way to interpret decisions made in 
Joint architecture efforts into the Naval 
Enterprise. 
• Provide the background for programmatic decision 
support for the Naval budget process. 
• Establish and define the specific contents of the 
“as is” and conceptual FORCEnet domains. 
• Provide the vehicle for FORCEnet configuration 
management. 
• Identify the operational concepts and 
technologies for verification in the SEA TRIAL 
process. 
• Provide the FORCEnet Roadmap in support of the 
FORCEnet Block Acquisition Strategy. 
The scope of the FORCEnet Architecture extends to Navy 
and Marine Corps forces and their direct support elements, 
including warriors, weapons, sensors, platforms, networks, 
command and control systems, and direct support systems.  
Because Navy and Marine Corps forces carry out national 
tasking as part of joint and coalition forces, the FORCEnet 
architecture includes elements from the other services that 
support or are supported by Naval forces.  The FORCEnet 
Architecture will therefore be compatible with the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) and other Joint and OSD initiatives. 
Any information flow, information item or process 
providing common service to more than one user node in 
support of a Sea Power 21 mission capability is considered 
part of FORCEnet.  Information flows, information items and 
  50
processes that are integral and completely self-contained 
within a particular system are not necessarily in the 
FORCEnet Architecture.  However, the goal of the 
architecture is to assimilate all common information flows, 
duplicate information items and overlapping processes into 
the FORCEnet domain.35 
 
a. FORCEnet Architecture Components 
The following list of architecture components and 
responsible organizations illustrates the projected scope 
of the architecture.  Most of the items are projected 
elements or are at very early stages of development. 
• Overview and Summary Information (AV-1)(SPAWAR 
05/NNWC) 
• Integrated Dictionary (AV-2)(SPAWAR 05) 
• FORCEnet Domain Definition (OPNAV N6/7) 
• FORCEnet Attributes, MOP’s and MOE’s (SPAWAR 
05/NAVNETWARCOM/NWDC) 
• FORCEnet Scenario Data base (OPNAV N7/JFCOM) 
• FORCEnet Block Acquisition Strategy (SPAWAR 
05/OPNAV N6/N7) 
• FORCEnet Science and Technology Data Base (SV-
9)(ONR) 
• FORCEnet Block Strategy Improvements Data base 
(SPAWAR 05/OPNAV N6/N7) 
• FORECEnet System Engineering Management Plan 
(SEMP)(SPAWAR 05) 
• High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-
1)(SPAWAR 05/NWDC/NAVNETWARCOM) 
• Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-
2)(SPAWAR 05/NWDC/NAVNETWARCOM) 
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• Operational Information Exchange Matrix (OV-
3)(SPAWAR 05/NWDC/NAVNETWARCOM) 
• Command Relationship Chart (OV-4)(SPAWAR 05/NWDC 
/NAVNETWARCOM) 
• Activity Model(OV-5)(SPAWAR 05/NWDC/NAVNETWARCOM) 
• Operational Sequence Diagrams and Behavior Model 
(OV-6/SV-10)(NWDC/SPAWAR 05/NAVNETWARCOM 
/SYSCOMS) 
• Logical and Physical Data Model (OV-7/SV-
11)(SPAWAR 05/SYSCOMS) 
• System Interface Description (SV-1)(SPAWAR 
05/SYSCOMS) 
• System Communication Description (SV-2)(SPAWAR 
05/SYSCOMS) 
• Capability Functional Description (SV-4)(SPAWAR 
05/SYSCOMS) 
• Activity Model to Functional Description Matrix 
(SV-5)(SPAWAR 05/SYSCOMS) 
• Information Exchange Matrix (SV-6)(SPAWAR 
05/SYSCOMS) 
• Performance Parameter Matrix (SV-7)(SPAWAR 
05/SYSCOMS) 
• Capability Evolution Description (SV-8)(SPAWAR 
05/NAVNETWARCOM/RDA Cheng/SYSCOMS) 
• Technology Forecast (SV-9)(ONR/NWDC) 
• Standards Profile (TV-1)(SPAWAR 05/SYSCOMS) 
• Standards Evolution Forecast (TV-2)(SPAWAR 
05/SYSCOMS) 
 
b. SPAWAR FORCEnet Definition 
The elements of the SPAWAR FORCEnet definition 
included in the architecture document are taken directly 
from higher echelon sources and restated here: 
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• FORCEnet is the operational construct and 
architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the 
Information Age that integrates Warriors, 
sensors, networks, command and control, 
platforms, and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat system.  This system is 
scalable across the spectrum of conflict from 
seabed to space and sea to land. 
• FORCEnet is the key enabling capability for the 
Sea Power 21 operational concepts of Sea Strike, 
Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. 
• A FORCEnet-enabled Naval force is a robustly 
networked force fully capable of operating in 
accordance with the concept and principles of 
Network Centric Operations/Warfare.  It is 
capable of carrying out effects-based operations 
with speed of command and self-synchronization. 
• FORCEnet is a key enabler of Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare that integrates Navy and Marine 
Corps capabilities. 
• FORCEnet is an inherently Joint/Coalition 
concept, both relying on and providing essential 
capabilities to the Joint/Coalition community and 
other Services and Agencies. 
• FORCEnet provides the Naval component of the 
Global Information Grid. 
• FORCEnet is an integrating initiative that 
provides for rich information sharing and 
collaboration throughout the Joint/Coalition and 
Naval Force that, in turn, enables full 
implementation of Network Centric Operations. 
• FORCEnet is not a traditional acquisition 
program, but rather a management process that 
aligns and integrates many individual acquisition 






c. FORCEnet Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and 
Measures of Performance (MOP) 
High order MOE’s are presented in the 
architecture along with their proposed MOP’s. 
 
• Timeliness of Information Dissemination (MOE) 
• Battle group update time 
• Cueing time 
• Weapons release time 
• Firing report time 
• Time-to-kill 
• Kill chain time 
• Accuracy of Networked Information (MOE) 
• Pre-fire track quality 
• Post-fire track quality 
• Geo-location accuracy 
• Connectivity of Force Elements (MOE) 
• Time to establish communications 
• Connectivity index 
• Capacity of Network (MOE) 
• Effective system capacity 
• System message overload 
• Bandwidth utilization 
• Bandwidth impedance 
• Track update impedance 
• Region of Time-Sensitive Engagement (MOE) 
• Maximum engagement range 
• Situational Awareness (MOE) 
• Force commander situational awareness 
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• Group commander situational awareness 
• Unit commander situational awareness 
• Weapon commander situational awareness 
• Effectiveness of Fires (MOE) 
• Firing Range 
• Vulnerability time 
• Weapons required 
• Sorties required 
• Countermeasures avoided 
• Hostile weapons fired 
• Blue losses 
 
d. Assumptions and Constraints 
The assumptions and constraints SPAWAR used to 
develop the draft architecture follow.  The most 
significant issues are included among the Findings in the 
next section. 
• FORCEnet does not refer only to a network.  It 
does refer to a capability and a strategy to 
achieve Joint and Coalition Network Centric 
Operations and Warfare. 
• FORCEnet shall include the Combat System. 
• FORCEnet is the Naval component of a 
Joint/Coalition architecture controlled by JFCOM 
and approved by the JROC. 
• FORCEnet is the Naval implementation of the 
Global Information Grid (GIG) Architecture. 
• FORCEnet requirements shall be collected by 
NAVNETWARCOM (N8), validated by CFFC (N8) and CNO 
(N6/N7) and presented to the FORCEnet Chief 
Architect for incorporation into the FORCEnet 
Architecture. 
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• Comments on requirements based on architectural 
analysis shall be presented to NAVNETWARCOM (N8) 
for adjudication. 
• The FORCEnet architecture shall support 
evolutionary development.  Current systems must 
migrate from present to target implementations. 
• The FORCEnet architecture shall use an iterative 
process.  Each iteration will extend or replace 
existing products. 
• FORCEnet architecture products shall be automated 
and easily modified. 
• Initial iterations must be accomplished rapidly—
learn and improve with each iteration. 
• Baseline architecture will include the BFC2, IO, 
ISR and NAV MCP architectures in combination with 
the Ashore Infrastructure Master Plan. 
• The architecture products or views developed by 
the FORCEnet Chief Architect shall be in 
accordance with the C4ISR Architecture Framework 
2.0. 
• The Chief Architect for FORCEnet is SPAWAR 05.  
SPAWAR 05 shall be responsible for the 
development of all of the architectural views and 
supporting products. 
• ASN RDA Cheng shall facilitate the FORCEnet 
Architecture process and will assist by 
establishing a common process, tool set, 
engineering environment and data structure. 
• The FORCEnet architecture effort will be 
coordinated with the following stakeholders who 
will have active roles in its development:  JFCOM 
(J8), CNO (N6/N7), ASN RDA Cheng, CFFC (N6/N8), 
NAVNETWARCOM (N6/N8), MCCDC, PEO C4I, PEO IWS, 
SPAWAR 05, NAVSEA 06, NAVAIR 4.0X, and 
MARCORPSYSCOM. 
• The acquisition strategy for FORCEnet will follow 
a Block implementation approach.  Guidance for 
the systems and changes incorporated in each 
Block shall be a direct result of an analysis of 
the FORCEnet architecture. 
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• The initial FORCEnet architecture assessment 
shall support POM-06. 
• To the maximum extent feasible, the FORCEnet 
transport layer will take advantage of commercial 
technology and networks by using open-systems 
standards and protocols. 
• IP will be the common standard that will 
facilitate data moving seamlessly between all 
entities. 
 
e. SPAWAR Findings 
The following findings are included in the 
architecture document. 
1. To Establish the FORCEnet Architecture, the supporting 
Operational Concepts and architectural views must be 
developed from the other pillars of Sea Power 21. 
• CAUSE:  FORCEnet has been the major focus on most 
efforts associated with Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW) transformation in the Navy.  The other 
pillars of Sea Power 21 (SEA BASING, SEA SHIELD 
and SEA STRIKE) have not received as much focus.  
Since the basic definition of FORCEnet is that it 
is the supporting infrastructure for the other 
pillars, operational Concepts and other 
architectural products need to be provided to 
FORCEnet from these efforts to better define the 
architecture of FORCEnet. 
• IMPACT:  The current FORCEnet Architecture effort 
and FORCEnet Block Acquisition Strategy shall be 
evolved based on assumptions of what the pillars 
need rather than actual architecture efforts.  
• RECOMMENDATION:  Establish coordinated, parallel 
architecture efforts for the other pillars at the 
appropriate SYSCOM’s, coordinated with the 
FORCEnet efforts at SPAWAR. 
2. Since the FORCEnet Architecture cuts across all 
SYSCOM’s and PEO’s, a clear management structure must be 
established between all stake holders. 
• CAUSE:  (Not given) 
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• IMPACT:  (Not given) 
• RECOMMENDATION:  (Not given) 
3. Conflicting FORCEnet definition, scope and context 
information has been promulgated from various authoritative 
Naval organizations. 
• CAUSE:  Several authoritative documents (Naval 
Transformation Roadmap, SSGXXI Study, etc.) 
referred to FORCEnet in differing ways, resulting 
in the terms “Little FORCEnet” and “Big 
FORCEnet.” 
• IMPACT:  Hinders the development of the FORCEnet 
Architecture because of differing concepts of 
scope and context of the architecture.  Is it 
just the network or the concept and strategy for 
Network Centric Warfare? 
• RECOMMENDATION:  Establish the AV-1 as the 
authoritative document for FORCEnet scope, 
context and definition for all FORCEnet 
Architecture efforts. 
4. FORCEnet must be born Joint.  Current information in 
authoritative documents portrays FORCEnet as a Naval 
capability that supports the Joint community.  FORCEnet 
must be a part of a Joint architecture that supports the 
Naval force. 
• CAUSE:  FORCEnet definitions and guidance are a 
result of Navy studies and documents.  Although 
most of the documents refer to the support of 
Joint operations, the focus is clearly a Navy 
first and USMC second infrastructure.  There is 
little discussion of initial coordination of 
FORCEnet efforts with Joint or other service 
organizations. 
• IMPACT:  Initial efforts of FORCEnet have not 
included horizontal or vertical coordination with 
other Services or the Joint community. 
• RECOMMENDATION:  Establish a direct coordination 
of FORCEnet Architecture efforts with other 
Services and the Joint community. 
5. A single Chief Architect must be named at the 
governing architecture level.  If FORCEnet is defined as 
supporting the other pillars of Sea Power 21, then there 
should be a Sea Power 21 Chief Architect to facilitate the 
architecture and resolve design conflicts where pillars 
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overlap.  The Sea Power 21 Chief Architect should be from a 
higher echelon than a PEO or SYSCOM. 
• CAUSE:  There is no coordinated effort between 
the architecture efforts of the Sea Power 21 
pillars.  Pillar efforts have been assigned to 
NAVAIR (SEA STRIKE), NAVSEA (SEA SHIELD and SEA 
BASING) and SPAWAR (FORCEnet).  There is no 
organization currently assigned to coordinate the 
efforts of all the Sea Power 21 pillars. 
• IMPACT:  The primary effort that is proceeding is 
a FORCEnet effort.  The FORECEnet effort is not 
being coordinate with the other Sea Power 21 
efforts.  Inconsistency between the operational 
concepts of the pillars is possible.  There is no 
organization to resolve functional and physical 
overlaps between the pillars. 
• RECOMMENDATION:  Name a SEA POWER Chief Architect 
to coordinate architecture efforts between the 
pillars.  Since architecture is a System 
Engineering discipline and the pillar concepts 
and Naval capabilities are directly related to 
the Mission Capability Package (MCP) efforts led 
by RDA CHENG, and Naval Enterprise Architectures 
are the responsibility of DON CIO, recommend the 
Sea Power 21 Chief Architect be either RDA CHENG 
or DON CIO. 
6. The FORCEnet architecture must be established based on 
an authoritative Joint and Coalition operational context.  
This operational context should be in the form of scenarios 
or design reference missions.  These scenarios or design 
reference missions must be approved and maintained at the 
Joint/DOD level. 
• CAUSE:  An architecture or system engineering 
effort without an operational context is 
meaningless to the operational community and 
impossible to relate to operational requirements.  
The operational situations used for design 
reference must reflect the actual operational 
environments in which the system or systems must 
operate.  If the operational context is Joint and 
Coalition then the governing reference scenarios 
must have a Joint and Coalition focus. 
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• IMPACT:  FORCEnet does not currently have a 
reference scenario list so the architecture will 
be generic and without operational context. 
• RECOMMENDATION:  A database of approved scenarios 
should be used as the reference for Sea Power 21 
operational context. 
7. A FORCEnet Block Acquisition Strategy needs to be 
developed to coordinate with the FORCEnet Architecture 
effort.  Immediate acquisition increments for FORCEnet can 
be proposed fixes or improvements to existing systems.  
These initial Blocks will help achieve the FORCEnet 
strategy of Network Centric Warfare, and will be derived 
from the guidelines established for FORCEnet, but not as a 
direct result of FORCEnet architectural analysis.  Future 
Blocks will be a direct result of the FORCEnet System 
Engineering process and resulting architecture products. 
• CAUSE:  (Not given) 
• IMPACT:  (Not given) 
• RECOMMENDATION:  (Not given) 
8. A direct relationship between the Integrated Prototype 
Demonstration (IPD) process and the Block Acquisition 
Strategy needs to be developed so that technology that is 
left behind in SEA TRIAL is either funded to a final 
production capability as a part of the PPBS process or 
removed from operational units to preserve configuration 
management in a disciplined speed-to-capability process. 
• CAUSE:  (Not given) 
• IMPACT:  (Not given) 
• RECOMMENDATION:  (Not given) 
9. Architecture development is the result of a System 
Engineering process not simply the development of 
architectural views.  A FORCEnet System Engineering 
Management Plan (SEMP) needs to be developed in accordance 
with IEEE 1220 to describe the System Engineering process 
required to establish the FORCEnet architecture. 
• CAUSE:  (Not given) 
• IMPACT:  (Not given) 
• RECOMMENDATION:  (Not given) 
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III. A FORCEnet FRAMEWORK 
The FORCEnet architecture is still in the early stages 
of development.  Descriptions of the conceptual view and 
portions of the operational view have been published.  The 
Naval organization is working toward a consensus regarding 
its scope and what it means by using an accepted 
architectural development process.  Eventually this 
deliberate process will generate a mature and iterative 
cycle of requirements, capabilities, systems, trials, 
acquisition and measures. 
In the meantime, in an effort to gain some “speed-to-
capability” and realize some of the anticipated potential 
of the Sea Power 21 concepts described earlier, decisions 
must continue to be made about the near-term shape of the 
anticipated FORCEnet architecture. 
Part of a viable approach to this decision analysis is 
to rely on the architecture processes of existing systems 
of systems.  The assumption can be reasonably made that 
these programs have been moving in the same general 
direction as the Sea Power 21 concepts, capitalizing on the 
advances made in the IT field and integrating up, down and 
across the range of capabilities.  These programs also have 
more mature processes for self-analysis.  This part of the 
approach should ensure that existing system and technical 
architectures continue to develop appropriately while 
FORCEnet architecture components begin to flow down. 
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At a higher level, existing programs should desire a 
means to measure their “FORCEnet compliance.”  Because the 
architectural tools to do such a self-assessment in an 
objective manner are just being developed, any analysis of 
this type at this time is subjective.  Done in good faith, 
a subjective analysis is useful to broadly assess 
relevance, interoperability, redundancy, etc. 
The purpose of this chapter is to collect the 
available FORCEnet characteristics, attributes and measures 
from the organizations in Chapter II to illustrate the 
level of organizational agreement and provide a collection 
of general measures for self-assessment.  An interested 
program should be able to use this information, the 
information in Chapter II and a general reading of the 
reference documents to conduct a reasonable comparison of 
itself with FORCEnet.  Of course, such a subjective 
comparison is only as good as the effort put into it, but 
the result should help determine, in a broad sense, what 
actions can be taken while the detailed guidance from the 
FORCEnet architecture effort continues to evolve. 
 
A. FORCEnet CHARACTERISTICS AND DEFINITIONS 
The following comparison of the characteristics and 
definitions across the organizations is based on stated 
positions and other information provided in Chapter II.  An 
“X” indicates that the organization specifically used the 
characteristic or definition.  An “A” indicates the 
author’s assessment that the organization would probably 
agree based on the sources.  A “?” indicates doubt about 




Characteristic/Definition SSG CNO 
N6/N7
NNWC SPAWAR
FORCEnet is the operational 
construct and architectural 
framework for Naval Warfare in 
the Information Age which 
integrates Warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, 
platforms and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat 
force, scalable across the 
spectrum of conflict from seabed 
to space and from sea to land. X X X X 
Top-level FORCEnet requirements: 
-Expeditionary, multi-tiered 
sensor and weapon information 
-Distributed, collaborative 
command and control 
-Dynamic, multi-path and 
survivable networks 











































FORCEnet is the key enabling 
capability for the Sea Power 21 
operational concepts of Sea 
Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea 
Basing. X X X X 
A FORCEnet-enabled Naval force is 
a robustly networked force fully 
capable of operating in 
accordance with the concept and 
principles of Network Centric 
Operations/Warfare.  It is 
capable of carrying out effects-
based operations with speed of 
command and self-
synchronization. X X X X 
FORCEnet is a key enabler of 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 
that integrates Navy and Marine 
Corps capabilities. X X X X 
FORCEnet is an inherently 
Joint/Coalition concept, both X X X X 
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relying on and providing 
essential capabilities to the 
Joint/Coalition community and 
other Services and Agencies. 
FORCEnet provides the Naval 
component of the Global 
Information Grid. X X X X 
FORCEnet is an integrating 
initiative that provides for 
rich information sharing and 
collaboration throughout the 
Joint/Coalition and Naval Force 
that, in turn, enables full 
implementation of Network 
Centric Operations. X X X X 
FORCEnet is not a traditional 
acquisition program, but rather 
a management process that aligns 
and integrates many individual 
acquisition programs to provide 
the needed capability. X X X X 
FORCEnet shall include the Combat 
System. X X X X 
Table 3.   FORCEnet Characteristics and 
Definitions Comparison 
 
B. FORCEnet ATTRIBUTES 
Most of the attributes listed below are discussed in 
the sources interchangeably as characteristics of FORCEnet 
and potential measures of FORCEnet.  The reason for this is 
that the overarching FORCEnet architecture has not evolved 
far enough to differentiate characteristics from measures. 
Descriptions of many of the attributes provided in the 
table below can be found in Chapter II.  An “X” indicates 
that the organization specifically used the attribute.  An 
“A” indicates the author’s assessment that the organization 
would probably agree based on the sources.  A “?” indicates 
doubt about the organization’s agreement. 
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 Attribute SSG CNO 
N6/N7
NNWC SPAWAR
Human-centric  X A A A 
Open X A X A 
Distributed X A X A 
Heterogeneous X A A A 
Secure X A A A 
Robust X A A A 
Interoperable X A X A 
Scalable X A A A 
Ubiquitous X A A A 
Collaborative X A A A 
Survivability X A X A 
Multifunction X A A A 
Multimission X A A A 
Joint Interoperability X A A A 
Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation X A A A 
Global Addressability X A A A 
Dynamic Routing X A A A 
Packet Efficiency X A A A 
Speed X A X A 
Accuracy A X A A 
Consistency A X A A 
Completeness A X A A 
Precision A X A A 
Timeliness A X A A 
Shared Situational Awareness A X A A 
Quantity of Posted Information A X A A 
Quantity of Retrievable 
Information A X A A 
Understandability A X A A 
Capacity A X A A 
Reach A X A A 
Connectivity A X A A 
Information Assurance A X A A 
Quality of Service (QOS) A X A A 
Agility A X A A 
Robustness A X A A 
Responsiveness A X A A 
Flexibility A X A A 
Innovativeness A X A A 
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Adaptiveness A X A A 
Competence A X A A 
Trust A X A A 
Confidence A X A A 
Size A X A A 
Experience A X A A 
Diversity A X A A 
Autonomy A X A A 
Structure A X A A 
Interdependence A X A A 
Cooperation A X A A 
Efficiency A X A A 
Synchronization A X A A 
Engagement A X A A 
Risk Propensity A X A A 
Lethality A X A A 
Coverage A X A A 
Persistence A X A A 
Survivability A X A A 
Table 4.   FORCEnet Attributes Comparison 
 
C. FORCEnet MEASURES 
Many of the measures listed below are simply restated 
attributes, interpreted differently.  Many of the measures 
are used by the organizations without specific criteria.  
For the measures that included any criteria, the 
specifications are so general that they are meaningless.  
This collection of measures is not useful for quantitative 
analysis, but is useful for subjective qualitative 
assessments of existing programs. 
 Descriptions of many of the measures can be found in 
Chapter II.  An “X” indicates that the organization 
specifically used the measure.  An “A” indicates the 
author’s assessment that the organization would probably 
agree based on the sources.  A “?” indicates doubt about 
the organization’s agreement. 
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 Measure SSG CNO 
N6/N7
NNWC SPAWAR
Throughput X A A A 
Efficiency X A A A 
Accuracy X X A A 
Area Coverage X A A A 
Range X A A A 
Scalability X A A A 
Resolution X A A A 
Bandwidth X A A A 
Availability X A A A 
Consistency A X A A 
Completeness A X A A 
Precision A X A A 
Timeliness A X A X 
Shared Situational Awareness A X A X 
Quantity of Posted Information A X A A 
Quantity of Retrievable 
Information A X A A 
Understandability A X A A 
Capacity A X A A 
Reach A X A A 
Connectivity A X A A 
Information Assurance A X A A 
Quality of Service (QOS) A X A A 
Agility A X A A 
Robustness A X A A 
Responsiveness A X A A 
Flexibility A X A A 
Innovativeness A X A A 
Adaptiveness A X A A 
Competence A X A A 
Trust A X A A 
Confidence A X A A 
Size A X A A 
Experience A X A A 
Diversity A X A A 
Autonomy A X A A 
Structure A X A A 
Interdependence A X A A 
Cooperation A X A A 
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Efficiency A X A A 
Synchronization A X A A 
Engagement A X A A 
Risk Propensity A X A A 
Lethality A X A A 
Coverage A X A A 
Persistence A X A A 
Survivability A X A A 
Timeliness of Information 
Dissemination (MOE) A A A X 
Battle group update time (MOP) A A A X 
Cueing time (MOP) A A A X 
Weapons release time (MOP) A A A X 
Firing report time (MOP) A A A X 
Time-to-kill (MOP) A A A X 
Kill chain time (MOP) A A A X 
Accuracy of Networked Information 
(MOE) A A A X 
Pre-fire track quality (MOP) A A A X 
Post-fire track quality (MOP) A A A X 
Geo-location accuracy (MOP) A A A X 
Connectivity of Force Elements 
(MOE) A A A X 
Time to establish communications 
(MOP) A A A X 
Connectivity index (MOP) A A A X 
Capacity of Network (MOE) A A A X 
Effective system capacity (MOP) A A A X 
System message overload (MOP) A A A X 
Bandwidth utilization (MOP) A A A X 
Bandwidth impedance (MOP) A A A X 
Track update impedance (MOP) A A A X 
Region of Time-Sensitive 
Engagement (MOE) A A A X 
Maximum engagement range (MOP) A A A X 
Situational Awareness (MOE) A A A X 
Force commander situational 
awareness (MOP) A A A X 
Group commander situational 
awareness (MOP) A A A X 
Unit commander situational 
awareness (MOP) A A A X 
Weapon commander situational 
awareness (MOP) A A A X 
  68
Effectiveness of Fires (MOE) A A A X 
Firing Range (MOP) A A A X 
Vulnerability time (MOP) A A A X 
Weapons required (MOP) A A A X 
Sorties required (MOP) A A A X 
Countermeasures avoided (MOP) A A A X 
Hostile weapons fired (MOP) A A A X 
Blue losses (MOP) A A A X 
Table 5.   FORCEnet Measures Comparison 
 
D. POTENTIAL BIASES TO CONSIDER IN A SELF-ASSESSMENT 
Successful use of the above information as a 
subjective framework for programs to determine rough 
“FORCEnet compliance” is best served by critical, objective 
self-assessment.  Biases invariably exist in every 
organization.  The questions below are not an exhaustive 
list, but may be useful to recognize organizational biases 
when doing a self-assessment. 
• Do I consider my system joint, and if so, why? 
• Do I consider my system interoperable, and if so, 
why? 
• What is my definition of interoperable? 
• Is the information processed on my system 
routable on an Internet Protocol (IP)-based 
network? 
• Do I think my system “Does it all?” 
• Where does funding for my system come from? 
• Are there competing systems elsewhere? 
• Am I willing to end my program to eliminate 
redundancy? 
• Am I willing to work with another, similar 
program to satisfy my requirements? 
• Can the requirements driving my program be met by 
another system? 
  69
• Does anyone consider my program “legacy?”  If so, 
why? 
• Does my “legacy” program have redeeming, 
FORCEnet-compliant qualities, such as practices 
or data? 
• Is my technology military specific or is it 
available in some form in the private sector? 
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IV. THE JOINT FIRES NETWORK (JFN) 
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated a critical 
operational deficiency in Time Critical Targeting (TCT) 
against rapidly relocatable targets.  Since the early 
1990s, this threat, including the potential delivery of 
weapons of mass destruction, has increased.  To address 
this deficiency Fleet forces identified a high priority 
need to develop a Joint Fires Network (JFN) that would 
provide a network-centric capability to support Naval and 
Joint Forces in the engagement of time critical targets. 
The Joint Fires Network is the initiative to address 
this deficiency by developing and integrating capabilities 
for near real time intelligence correlation, sensor 
control, target generation and development, mission 
planning, interfaces to engagement systems and battle 
damage assessment into a streamlined architecture.  JFN is 
created by interfacing, and ultimately integrating, “best 
of breed” elements of many existing systems into a 
converged architecture.  The primary components of JFN are 
the Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-N), 
the Tactical Exploitation System-Navy (TES-N), and the 
Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M).  All 
elements of this converged architecture are interoperable 
to some degree across all of the services.36 
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B. COMPONENTS AND ARCHITECTURE 
JFN currently incorporates the functions of several 
systems:  the Tactical Exploitation System–Navy (TES-N), 
the Joint Service Imagery Processing System–Navy (JSIPS-N), 
and the Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-
M).  These systems perform various Tasking, Processing, 
Exploitation and Dissemination (TPED) functions that allow 
decision makers to exploit and manage multiple-source 
sensor data.  JFN will eventually incorporate systems, 
collectively called Integrated Cooperative Engagement (ICE) 
systems, which will connect the decision and weapons grids, 
enabling the “to-shooter” half of the “sensor-to-shooter” 
equation. 
 
1. Tactical Exploitation System–Navy (TES-N) 
TES-N is a Navy shipboard implementation of the Army 
Tactical Exploitation System (TES-A).  It is an integrated, 
scalable, multi-intelligence system designed for rapid 
correlation of national and theater intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) information to 
support network centric operations.  TES provides the war-
fighting commander with access to time sensitive, all-
weather, all-source and continuously updated day or night 
battle space ISR information.  It supports time critical 
targeting through rapid cueing, immediate retasking of 
selected imaging sensors for target identification and 
precise position reporting.  It can pass selected targets 
directly to weapon control systems such as the Army’s Field 
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).  It also supports 
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real time uplink of targeting data to Navy and Air Force 
tactical aircraft using the Tactical Dissemination Module 
(TDM). 
The modular TES architecture is scalable to meet a 
variety of configuration needs, including rack mounting for 
ships and vehicle mounting for ground and ashore forces.  
In addition, a deployable TES workstation, known as the 
Remote Terminal Component (RTC), can provide immediate 
multi-intelligence access to sensor products, displays, and 
control functions for remote operators in all services.  
The RTC can operate over a wide range of bandwidths from 
lower bandwidth displays up to real time display of 
correlated multiple intelligence products. 
TES-N can be configured as a stand-alone system or as 
a server supporting multiple RTC’s.  RTC and RTC-Lite 
(laptop version) have a lower cost and equipment footprint 
than full systems, for installation aboard space-
constrained platforms like surface combatants and attack 
submarines.  The RTC configuration does not normally 
include Common Data Link-Navy (CDL-N), so RTC units are 
dependent on full TES systems with CDL-N antennas to 
forward real time downlink of theater and tactical imagery 
intelligence (IMINT) feeds from airborne collection 
platforms.  The RTC/RTC-Lite operates in a client-server 
relationship with the full system creating a near-real time 
network that shares information among geographically 
dispersed nodes. 
All four services have TES, but it plays different 
roles in their ISR architectures.  TES-N is functionally 
identical to and interoperable with TES-A, but TES-N 
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functionality does not carry throughout the Navy 
architecture where the common RTC-Lite is primarily used as 
a situational awareness tool that allows TES preprocessed 
data to be shared in a distributed environment.  The Marine 
Corps’ Tactical Exploitation Group (TEG) is a TES-like 
capability incorporated as part of its family of ISR 
systems, the Marine Air-Ground Intelligence Systems 
(MAGIS).  TEG focuses on imagery-only functions, but allows 
dissemination of data throughout the TES-N network.  The 
Air Force is using a subset of the TES operating system in 
its ISR Manager (ISR-M), which enhances Air Force access to 
broader multiple intelligence information through the 
shared TES ISR picture.  This commonality allows the Naval 
commander to share real-time battle space awareness rapidly 
and seamlessly with other services, and participate fully 
in Joint collaborative prosecution of time critical 
targets. 
TES-N key capabilities include: 
• Direct link to tactical platforms and sensors at 
sea (including U2, Global Hawk and F/A-18). 
• U2 sensor control, flight track and collection 
plan access and modification. 
• Predator flight tracks and video. 
• MTI (Moving Target Indicators) receipt from Joint 
STARS. 
• Automated creation of MTI tracks and overlay on 
the Integrated Tactical Display. 
• SIGINT reports accepted and included into a  
multi-intelligence visualization.  Tracks are 
created for moving threats. 
• Request, receipt and visualization of National 
imagery (including chart overlays). 
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• Video frame grab and mosaic capability (including 
chart overlays). 
• Direct access to selected classified sensors. 
• Full message handling and creation capability, 
including collaborative tools. 
• Extensive dissemination via multiple 
communication paths. 
• Web-based capabilities. 
• Target nomination via ADOCS and AFATDS. 
• GCCS-M track interface to support C2. 
• Large screen, multiple intelligence, source 
correlated, geo-registered, overlayable displays. 
• Interoperable with other services’ Distributed 
Common Ground Station (DCGS) systems (TES-A, ISR-
M, etc.). 
• Operation at multiple security levels (GENSER and 
SCI).37 
 
2. Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy 
(JSIPS-N) 
JSIPS-N comprises the operational targeting system on 
carriers, large deck amphibious assault ships, command 
ships and shore sites supporting training and test 
activities.  It provides imagery exploitation and targeting 
for precision-guided munitions (PGM) in support of carrier-
based strike.  In addition, JSIPS-N imagery exploitation 
and target folder services support Tomahawk Land Attack 
Missile (TLAM) strike planning.  Shipboard interfaces 
include Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-
M), Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS) and 
the Afloat Planning System (APS).  External interfaces 
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include intelligence databases, data sources and joint 
mission planning systems.  JSIPS-N components include the 
JSIPS-N Concentrator Architecture (JCA), the Tactical Input 
Segment (TIS), the Precision Targeting Workstation (PTW) 
and the Strike Planning Folder (SPF). 
JSIPS-N key capabilities include: 
• National imagery receipt and processing. 
• Video frame grab. 
• Ortho-rectification of imagery. 
• Geo-registration and warping. 
• Imagery stitching into map background. 
• Real-time waterfall display. 
• Output to combat, weapons and mission planning 
systems.38 
 
3. Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-
M) 
GCCS-M is installed on every surface ship in the US 
Navy, most attack submarines, tactical support centers and 
shore command sites.  GCCS-M is the result of integration 
of previous command and control (C2) and intelligence 
systems.  It supports multiple war fighting and 
intelligence missions for commanders at every echelon, 
afloat, ashore, and in tactical naval environments, and for 
joint, coalition, and allied forces.  It meets the joint 
and Navy requirements for a single, integrated, scaleable 
C2 system that receives, displays, correlates, fuses, and 
maintains geo-located track information on friendly, 
hostile, and neutral land, sea and air forces and 
integrates it with available intelligence and environmental 
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information.  One of the products of GCCS-M is the Common 
Operational Picture (COP), a near-real-time, fused 
situational awareness picture that supports C2 requirements 
for decision makers through every level of operations, from 
peacetime through general war.  Current interoperability 
with other naval systems (Advanced Tomahawk Weapon Control 
System [ATWCS], Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System 
[TTWCS], MEDAL, etc.), other service systems (Theater 
Ballistic Missile Defense System [TBMDS] and joint systems 
is achieved through compliance with the Defense Information 
Infrastructure Common Operating Environment (DIICOE). 
GCCS-M key capabilities include: 
• Multi-source information management and display. 
• Dissemination of the COP across platforms and 
with joint systems through extensive 
communication interfaces. 
• Multi-source data correlation and decision-making 
tools allowing force coordination. 
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) reports accepted, 
correlated, and where appropriate assigned as new 
tracks. 
• Request, receipt, storage and visualization of 
national imagery (including chart overlay). 
• Association of tracks with relational database 
(DB) entities (imagery and intelligence DB 
records). 
• Operation at multiple security levels (GENSER and 
SCI). 
• Full message handling, storage and creation 
capability. 
• Collaborative tools. 
• Web-based capabilities.39 
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4. Interactive Cooperative Engagement (ICE) 
ICE describes the conceptual systems that will 
eventually enable direct transmission of operational and 
targeting data from the other JFN components to engagement 
platforms.  In essence, ICE will be the “-to-shooter” part 
of the “sensor-to-shooter” concept.  Because weapons 
control systems are deterministic, high-reliability systems 
specialized for specific weapons or weapons delivery 
platforms, JFN will need to use the components of ICE to 
bridge the gap between the combat information system 
environment and the weapons control system environment.  
Functionally, ICE can be divided into two categories: 1) a 
Target/Weapon Pairing component, and 2) components that 
electronically disseminate target packets to designated 
weapon platforms and systems.40 
 
5. JFN Communications 
Because of the need to rapidly receive and correlate 
ISR data from many different tactical and national sources, 
and the need to disseminate processed data to operating 
forces, JFN communication requirements are demanding.  
There is no dedicated or persistent communication 
architecture to support these requirements, resulting in an 
ad hoc, but substantial effort by the JFN program to ensure 
its access to sufficient communication capacity.  This 
effort is describe below. 
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a. JFN Communication Requirements 
JFN requires high bandwidth, direct access to in-
theater tactical imagery and SIGINT products from multi-
service airborne collectors.  The Common Data Link–Navy 
(CDL-N) capability satisfies this requirement aboard the 
Navy’s larger afloat platforms. 
CDL-N is a DOD-mandated interoperable, point-to-
point, high bandwidth (up to 275 Mbps), secure data link 
for microwave downlink and onboard processing of ISR data 
from U-2, Global Hawk, RC-12 (Guard Rail), F/A-18 
(ATARS/SHARP), S-3B (SSU), SH-60 LAMPS (HAWKLINK) and P-3C 
(AIP, Special Projects).  CDL-N consists of two antennas 
(one meter diameter) and five racks of below-deck equipment 
per shipboard installation.  It operates in a line-of-sight 
(LOS) mode with one collector at a time, currently in the X 
and Ku bands with Low Probability of Intercept (LPI).  CDL-
N is installed on some aircraft carriers, and other large 
ships, and is programmed for installation on all carriers, 
large-deck amphibious ships and command ships. 
JFN also requires high bandwidth, long-haul 
communication for ISR data collected outside of the 
theater.  While limited JFN functions are possible with low 
bandwidth, robust connectivity with and among platforms 
afloat is required to support time critical targeting. 
 
b. JFN Communication Approach 
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For shipboard communication in general, the TES-
N/RTC connection to the IT21 LAN limits the data rate to 
128 kbps (medium bandwidth).  SPAWAR is installing 
additional connections to reduce this bottleneck on larger 
ships, which are able to dedicate more bandwidth to JFN 
when required.  Future JFN installations will make 
modifications to TES-N and the Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS) router to allow consolidation using Quality 
of Service (QOS) and packet shaping.  This approach will 
allow better shipboard bandwidth management and will 
alleviate the use of limited crypto resources. 
For robust TES server/RTC client configurations, 
JFN fielding requires an upgrade in satellite communication 
(SATCOM) capabilities for the Fleet.  The near-term JFN 
communications architecture uses a combination of SATCOM 
solutions, including SHF Defense Satellite Communications 
Service (DSCS) X-band, Commercial Wideband Satellite 
Program (CWSP) C-band and EHF MDR. 
• CWSP C-band:  This has been implemented worldwide 
at 2 Mbps full-duplex worldwide, providing 
sufficient commercial C-band bandwidth for 
shipboard processing, correlation, exploitation 
and precision targeting on up to 14 large deck 
ships. 
• DSCS X-band:  This uses existing DSCS network 
terrestrial and space segment infrastructure to 
support the bandwidth required by JFN on ships 
that can support the large antenna required.  The 
Navy must obtain Joint allocation of bandwidth 
for those ships from regional war fighting 
commanders. 
• EHF MDR:  This will provide quality of service, 
the lowest possible latency, load balancing and 
dynamic bandwidth allocation coupled with a much 
smaller antenna.  It is a highly protected 
waveform, providing up to 14 dedicated point-to-
point T1 services.  It will be the best and 
lowest cost option for meeting future JFN 
requirements.  EHF MDR is also dependent on the 
theater commander's allocation of bandwidth.41 
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C. COMPARISON WITH THE FORCEnet FRAMEWORK 
 
1. JFN in the FORCEnet Context 
 The following tables use the framework from Chapter 
III to generally compare JFN to the concepts and attributes 
of FORCEnet.  As previously discussed, such an assessment 
can only be subjective, and therefore open to 
interpretation.  The measures to provide an objective 
analysis are not available.  The goal of this type of 
assessment is to create a rough comparison of JFN to 
FORCEnet to highlight the areas of close agreement or 
disagreement.  The product could serve as a catalyst for 
discussions about the areas that are not clearly compared 
or contrasted and help the existing program with 
discussions about its future path. 
Descriptions of the characteristics, definitions and 
attributes may be found in Chapter II. 
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Legend: 
“Y” = JFN is consistent with this item. 
“N”  = JFN is not consistent with this item. 
“NA” = This item is not applicable to JFN. 
 
FORCEnet Characteristic/Definition JFN Comments 
FORCEnet is the operational 
construct and architectural 
framework for Naval Warfare in 
the Information Age which 
integrates Warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, 
platforms and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat 
force, scalable across the 
spectrum of conflict from seabed 
to space and from sea to land. 
Y  
Top-level FORCEnet requirements: 
-Expeditionary, multi-tiered 
sensor and weapon information 
-Distributed, collaborative 
command and control 
-Dynamic, multi-path and 
survivable networks 






















FORCEnet is the key enabling 
capability for the Sea Power 21 
operational concepts of Sea 
Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea 
Basing. 
Y  
A FORCEnet-enabled Naval force is 
a robustly networked force fully 
capable of operating in 
accordance with the concept and 
principles of Network Centric 
Operations/Warfare.  It is 
capable of carrying out effects-





FORCEnet is a key enabler of 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 
that integrates Navy and Marine 
Corps capabilities. 
Y -Marine Corps is 
not using TES. 
FORCEnet is an inherently 
Joint/Coalition concept, both 
relying on and providing 
essential capabilities to the 
Joint/Coalition community and 
other Services and Agencies. 
Y  
FORCEnet provides the Naval 
component of the Global 
Information Grid. 
Y  
FORCEnet is an integrating 
initiative that provides for 
rich information sharing and 
collaboration throughout the 
Joint/Coalition and Naval Force 
that, in turn, enables full 
implementation of Network 
Centric Operations. 
Y  
FORCEnet is not a traditional 
acquisition program, but rather 
a management process that aligns 
and integrates many individual 
acquisition programs to provide 
the needed capability. 
Y  
FORCEnet shall include the Combat 
System. 
Y -Anticipated with 
ICE, but ad hoc 
now. 
Table 6.   FORCEnet Characteristics and 
Definitions Comparison to JFN 
 
Legend: 
“Y” = JFN has this FORCEnet attribute. 
“N”  = JFN does not have this FORCEnet attribute. 
“NA” = This FORCEnet attribute does not apply to JFN. 
 
FORCEnet Attribute JFN Comments 
Human-centric  N Future capability. 
Open N Future capability. 
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Distributed N Future capability.  
Client/server now. 
Heterogeneous N Future capability. 
Secure Y  
Robust N Future capability. 
Interoperable Y Subject to definition. 
Scalable Y  
Ubiquitous N Future capability. 
Collaborative Y  
Survivability NA Info weapons attribute. 
Multifunction Y  
Multimission Y  
Joint Interoperability Y Subject to definition. 
Dynamic Bandwidth 
Allocation 
Y Manually managed. 
Global Addressability Y  
Dynamic Routing Y  
Packet Efficiency N Future capability. 
Speed Y Not reliable. 
Accuracy Y  
Consistency N Future capability. 
Completeness Y  
Precision Y  




Quantity of Posted 
Information 
Y  
Quantity of Retrievable 
Information 
Y  
Understandability Y  
Capacity N Future capability. 
Reach N Future capability. 
Connectivity N Future capability. 
Information Assurance Y  
Quality of Service (QOS) Y  
Agility N Future capability. 
Robustness N Future capability. 
Responsiveness Future capability. 
Flexibility N Future capability. 
Innovativeness N Future capability. 
Adaptiveness N Future capability. 
Competence N Human-centric attribute. 
Trust N Human-centric attribute. 
N 
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Confidence N Human-centric attribute. 
Size N Human-centric attribute. 
Experience N Human-centric attribute. 
Diversity N Human-centric attribute. 
Autonomy N Human-centric attribute. 
Structure N Human-centric attribute. 
Interdependence N Human-centric attribute. 
Cooperation N Human-centric attribute. 
Efficiency N Human-centric attribute. 
Synchronization N Human-centric attribute. 
Engagement N Human-centric attribute. 
Risk Propensity N Human-centric attribute. 
Lethality NA Info weapons attribute. 
Coverage NA Info weapons attribute. 
Persistence NA Info weapons attribute. 
Survivability NA Info weapons attribute. 
Table 7.   FORCEnet Attributes Comparison to JFN 
 
2. JFN Suitability as an Early Component of FORCEnet 
JFN is suitable as a component of an early FORCEnet 
architecture.  It has, or has planned, many of the 
attributes anticipated for FORCEnet, as the simple exercise 
above shows.  This is not a fortunate coincidence.  The 
need for JFN and the need for FORCEnet arose from the same 
basic need to more effectively interconnect the force and 
capitalize on the potential of information technology 
advances. 
JFN struggles with distracting issues.  These include 
communication, networking, interoperability and weapon 
interfaces.  JFN is compelled to focus a great deal of 
resources on ensuring the viability and persistence of its 
communication paths.  At some point in the future, if the 
promise of FORCEnet succeeds, JFN should be able to rely on 
enterprise infrastructure rather than apportioned resources 
for its communication needs.  JFN networking suffers as a 
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direct result of communication difficulties.  Various 
bandwidth restrictions throughout the force prevent 
persistent connections and inhibit development of new 
networking technologies such as peering, which could help 
reduce the time critical targeting cycle. 
Interoperability issues arise continuously due to the 
large number of interfaces with other services’ 
architectures.  Each new interface is unpredictable because 
the systems do not share a common set of architectural 
standards.  JFN interfaces to weapons systems will require 
unique translators for each weapon system incorporated into 
the architecture. 
Finally, the Sea Strike and Sea Shield architectures 
will eventually reach or surpass the development level of 
the FORCEnet architecture.  JFN includes functions, such as 
ICE, and possibly targeting, that could reasonably be 
interpreted as falling into the Sea strike and or Sea 
Shield domain.  Though unlikely in the medium-term, it is 
conceivable that the promise of FORCEnet is to reduce the 
JFN architecture to its core competencies of intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance and, possibly, targeting. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to answer the question, 
“What is FORCEnet?”  It is a concept and a construct in the 
early stages of development with broad implications for the 
Naval services in the future.  There is a general consensus 
at the senior leadership levels about the scope of FORCEnet 
and its implications.  This is because the Navy has 
effectively been implementing FORCEnet-like ideas for some 
time by using existing systems and architectures.  However, 
the vision of Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet will inevitably 
require new technology, techniques and doctrine that cannot 
yet be foreseen. 
 
A. ARCHITECTURE 
The complexity implied by the FORCEnet concepts is not 
trivial.  The envisioned architecture far exceeds any 
previous integration effort attempted by the Navy.  A 
capability-based architecture development process using 
sound system engineering practices is an effective 
approach.  Because of its deliberative and capability-based 
nature, this approach will be at odds with both the 
institutional need for accelerated development to address 
emerging threats, and a platform-oriented versus 
capability-oriented acquisition system.  Additionally, the 
language of the capability-based approach is being misused, 
with characteristics, attributes and measures being used 
interchangeably because the architecture products have not 
been developed enough to differentiate them yet.  This 
creates confusion for those trying to appreciate the scope 
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of the Sea Power 21 concepts.  This problem will solve 
itself in time as the architecture products emerge and 
system engineering practices become more widespread. 
The FORCEnet architecture should help to clarify the 
boundaries around existing systems such as JFN.  The 
current effort of these systems to accomplish their mission 
leads to duplication of effort and waste.  Near the edges 
of their generally accepted architectures the next 
interface is poorly developed or does not exist.  The 
result is that every system must build an end-to-end 
capability when they should be able to use enterprise 
infrastructure such as persistent, generic and adequate 
communication assets. 
The guidelines of the framework presented in this 
thesis are necessarily subjective.  Objective guidelines 
can only emerge after there is a broad-based understanding 
and acceptance of the principles of FORCEnet, and when 
existing systems have been evaluated for relevance against 
the FORCEnet architecture.  Useful technologies and 
practices will be retained and then gaps will be filled 
with compliant technology and practices. 
Comparing existing system and technical architectures 
to conceptual and operational architectures is subjective, 
but necessary, until the operational view to systems view 
gap is bridged.  The stronger the guidelines for 
comparison, the less subjective the process, but biases 




Until that gap is bridged, the following actions are 
recommended:  
• Explore the Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet 
interpretations of other major organizations as 
they emerge (NETC, NWDC, etc.) and adjust the 
Chapter III framework accordingly. 
• Improve the Chapter III framework by increasing 
and defining the guidelines for the conceptual 
and operational architectures as consensus 
builds. 
• Compare additional systems to FORCEnet using the 
Chapter III framework to develop a consistent 
method for doing the assessment. 
• Recruit a Marine Corps student to add to the 
perspective in this thesis when Marine Corps 
organizations begin to publish relevant material.  
Assess the general FORCEnet compliance of a USMC 
system using the Chapter III framework. 
• Determine the development path JFN should follow 
to continue toward fuller compliance with 
FORCEnet. 
The information in this thesis should become mostly 
obsolete within a short time of its publication as the 
FORCEnet architecture develops.  If that architecture 
develops quickly, there should be little future need for 
the type of self-assessment tool proposed in this work.  If 
the architecture develops slowly for any of a number of 
reasons, updating the tool proposed here will provide some 
value for bridging the operational view to system view gap, 
and as a summary educational tool. 
 
B. BARRIERS 
FORCEnet is intended to transcend organizational 
boundaries to integrate joint, coalition and interagency 
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platforms, systems, networks and weapons, as well as non-
governmental and international agencies when necessary.42 
There is little discussion so far of how FORCEnet will 
achieve interoperability, politically and organizationally, 
with other services and agencies.  The interoperability 
challenge faced by the Naval services is a refection of the 
larger challenge faced by DOD. 
The complexity of FORCEnet’s requirements demands a 
significantly different process than that used for system 
procurement today and in the past.  The Navy’s requirement 
and acquisition processes today are stove-piped and heavily 
platform centric.  Within the Navy, there is a great deal 
of discussion about the need for interoperability and 
systems integration; however, interoperability and systems 
integration are continually unfunded requirements.  The 
Navy funds individual systems and platforms, while FORCEnet 
requirements and acquisition requires providing 
capabilities across systems and platforms.43  For example, 
the following two capability-based requirements will not 
develop well in a platform-based acquisition environment: 
• Information and knowledge management as 
envisioned are inherently network-based, 
distributed and without a native platform.  
Without capability-based acquisition these 
requirements will not likely be adequately 
developed. 
• The challenge of fielding effective human-centric 
network services is underestimated and may not be 
achievable for some time.  It will require 
extensive research and development to field 
universal human-system interfaces that cross 
platform lines. 
                     42 Mayo and Nathman, pp. 45-46. 
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43 FORCEnet Project Coordinator, p. 9. 
Budgetary and political barriers will hinder progress.  
This problem will be particularly acute for integration 
with organizations outside of DOD.  Strong leadership is 
necessary to accelerate organizational realignment to break 
down barriers to progress. 
 
C. GENERATIONAL CHANGE 
The Naval services are moving as a whole along the 
path that Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet describe, but there is 
much uncertainty and skepticism at every level about the 
vagueness and potential for success of such conceptual 
architectures.  It is tempting to believe that despite the 
soundness of the concepts, transformational change will 
only happen through a bottom-up generational process of 
education and attrition.  The present Navy leadership does 
not accept this premise, believing that change must be 
accelerated as much as possible to maintain preeminence, 
and contending that leadership through the chain of command 
can and should be strongly influenced from the top.44  The 
final solution lies somewhere in the middle. 
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APPENDIX A:  FORCEnet REQUIRED CAPABILITIES 
In addition to the top-level FORCEnet capabilities 
discussed in Chapter II, NAVNETWARCOM has provided their 
supporting capabilities as organized in the figure below.  
Each of the supporting capabilities is described in detail 
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Figure 2.   FORCEnet Capability Mapping (From:  




A. PROVIDE EXPEDITIONARY, MULTI-TIERED SENSOR AND WEAPON 
INFORMATION 
• Collect, process and distribute organic sensor 
and weapon information. 
• The ability to collect, process, and 
distribute organic sensor data/information 
to tactical units in a real-time/near real-
time manner is required.  All naval force 
sensors, including platform based, unmanned, 
and fixed deployable, must be netted in a 
seamless manner to transcend platform 
dependency and enable projection of maximum 
combat power of the total force.  Ability to 
distribute weapon information in a seamless, 
netted manner to provide in-route command 
and control, Battle Damage Assessment, etc. 
• Collect, process and distribute non-organic 
sensor information. 
• The ability to collect, process, and 
distribute non-organic sensor 
data/information to tactical units in a 
real-time/near real-time manner is required.  
National and theater level sensors must be 
netted in a seamless manner as an enabler 
for the projection of maximum combat power 
of the total force. 
• Provide precise navigation and time to integrate 
weapons and sensors. 
• The ability to navigate and control weapons 
and sensors includes capability for sensors 
to determine their own position, time and 
movement/track at the time they are 
reporting a target or some piece of 
intelligence information.  Properly 
attributed precise navigation and time 
information is required of sensors and 
platforms for them to be accurately 
understood, represented and fused with other 
data in a war fighting relevant manner. 
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B. CONDUCT DISTRIBUTED, COLLABORATIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL 
• Conduct battle management/C2 with Joint forces. 
• To collaboratively manage land, air, sea, 
and space operational forces in time, space, 
and purpose to produce maximum relative 
combat power and minimize risk to own 
forces.  This activity ensures all elements 
of the operational force, including other 
services’ forces, are efficiently and safely 
employed to maximize their combined effects 
beyond the sum of their individual 
capabilities.  To provide operational 
information in a timely way, in an 
appropriate form, and by any suitable means, 
to the theater and JTF commanders and to 
ensure that the information is understood 
and considered by the commanders.  To ensure 
the transmission to all organizations and 
personnel with a need to know informational 
materials produced in response to theater of 
operations/JOA information requirements. 
• Conduct battle management/C2 with Coalition 
forces. 
• To collaboratively manage land, air, sea, 
and space operational forces in time, space, 
and purpose to produce maximum relative 
combat power and minimize risk to own 
forces.  This activity ensures all elements 
of the operational force, including 
supported nations’ forces, are efficiently 
and safely employed to maximize their 
combined effects beyond the sum of their 
individual capabilities.   
• Collect, fuse and disseminate operational 
intelligence. 
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• To obtain operationally significant 
information on enemy (and friendly) force 
strengths and vulnerabilities, threat 
operational doctrine, and forces (land, sea, 
and air and space).  Threat includes threat 
allies, and, in military operations other 
than war, insurgents, terrorists, illegal 
drug traffickers, belligerents in peace 
support or peace-enforcement situations, and 
other opponents.  It also includes 
collecting information on the nature and 
characteristics of the area of interest, to 
include hazards, such as NBC contamination.  
The nature and characteristics of the area 
include significant political, economic, 
industrial, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, 
hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), 
demographic, medical, climatic, and 
cultural, as well as psychological profiles 
of the resident populations. 
• Provide automated, timely access and exchange of 
data between Allied and Coalition forces. 
• To optimize each member nation’s 
intelligence and information capabilities, 
incorporate and exploit those capabilities, 
determine what information may be shared 
with multinational partners, and to provide 
member forces a common intelligence picture 
tailored to their requirements and 
consistent with disclosure policies of 
member nations. 
• Assess, characterize and disseminate 
environmental information. 
• To determine climatological and 
meteorological conditions and limitations 
which may affect or impair operations (both 
afloat and ashore).  To include weather 
observation, collection, analysis, 
forecasting, determination of tidal and 
current conditions, predicted surf 
conditions, storm evasion tracks and storm 
sanctuary sites.  Environmental information 
must be disseminated in a netted manner to 
ensure seamless distribution to all units in 
the combined force. 
• Collaborate with civil/law enforcement agencies. 
• Ability to conduct collaborative mission 
planning and execution with civil/law 
enforcement agencies to optimize mission 
execution objectives. 
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• Provide common geospatial and temporal referenced 
battle space awareness. 
• The ability to fuse precise navigation and 
time data from many sources and “gridlock” 
it through precise navigation and time 
variance/covariance estimates, common 
filtering algorithms and a common time 
reference frame. 
 
C. PROVIDE DYNAMIC, MULTI-PATH AND SURVIVABLE NETWORKS 
• Manage information transfer among Naval forces. 
• To direct, establish, or control the means 
used in sending or receiving operational 
information of any kind and to use standard 
communication networks and modes, where 
possible, for obtaining or sending 
operational information.   
• Manage information transfer with national 
networks. 
• To direct, establish, or control the means 
used in sending or receiving operational 
information of any kind and to use standard 
communication networks and modes, where 
possible, for obtaining or sending 
operational information. 
• Manage information transfer with Joint forces. 
• To direct, establish, or control the means 
used in sending or receiving operational 
information of any kind and to use standard 
communication networks and modes, where 
possible, for obtaining or sending 
operational information.  C4 systems include 
systems required for support to other 
services in military operations and 
operations other than war. 
• Manage information transfer with Allied and 
Coalition forces. 
• To direct, establish, or control the means 
used in sending or receiving operational 
information of any kind and to use standard 
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communication networks and modes, where 
possible, for obtaining or sending 
operational information.  C4 systems include 
systems required for support to friendly 
nations and groups in military operations 
other than war.   
• Protect friendly information networks. 
• Employ actions to maintain effective command 
and control of own forces by turning to 
friendly advantage (or negating) an 
adversary’s efforts to deny netted 
information to friendly forces, or an 
adversary’s efforts to influence, degrade or 
destroy the friendly C2 network.  To search 
for, intercept, identify, and locate sources 
of intentional network attack for the 
purpose of immediate threat recognition. 
• Establish networks with synchronized position and 
time. 
• Ability for networks to determine precise 
position, time and time interval.  Precise 
position and time data are required to 
synchronize communications links and 
networks, and encryption devices.  Not only 
is this capability needed to communicate, 
but it can also function as a position and 
time transfer function to units that have 
suffered losses in their own organic PNT 
capabilities. 
 
D. PROVIDE ADAPTIVE/AUTOMATED DECISION AIDS 
• Conduct operational and tactical planning. 
• To make detailed plans, staff estimates, and 
decisions for implementing the theater 
combatant commander’s theater strategy, 
associated sequels, and anticipated 
campaigns or major operations.  Plans and 
orders address, among other things, centers 
of gravity, branches, sequels, culminating 
points and phasing.  Planning includes 
organizing an effective staff, structuring 
and organizing the force, considering 
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multinational capabilities/limitations, and 
cross-leveling or balancing service 
component, joint, and national C4 means.  
Plans should address specific missions and 
tasks for subordinate joint and 
multinational task forces, service and 
functional components and supporting 
commands and agencies.   
• Conduct netted, prognostic logistics. 
• The ability to forecast the future condition 
and needs of equipment and people by melding 
detailed understanding of the current 
condition of the monitored item or person 
with information about the anticipated 
operational profile.  On the material side, 
prognostics will enable the force to 
accurately forecast needs and arrange for 
the delivery of those needs before the 
shortage exists.  With respect to people, 
prognostics will enable the identification 
of conditions that could be detrimental to 
the health and well being of the war fighter 
long before his performance degrades, 
keeping him operating optimally. 
• Organize, synchronize and integrate fires and 
maneuver to enable massed effects. 
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• Provide decision aids that enable commanders 
to deploy forces to achieve massing of 
effects without the requirement to mass 
units.  This would include arranging 
surface, subsurface, air, and ground forces 
and coordinate detection assets and tactical 
fires with the maneuver of forces in time, 
space, and purpose to support the 
commander’s concept of operations and 
produce maximum relative combat power of 
combined arms at the decisive point.  The 
goal is to maximize the effects of fires to 
accomplish the mission and minimize the 
effects on friendly forces, neutrals, and 
noncombatants.  This capability includes 
requests to higher authorities and requests 
to or support of non-assigned units 
operating within the area of operations, 
ships and units of foreign nations not under 
US command, and coordinating with external 
agencies and elements. 
• Dynamically allocate and control sensors and 
sensor platforms. 
• Provide decision aids that enable commanders 
to deploy sensors and sensor platforms to 
dramatically increase the fidelity of the 
battle space situational awareness, 
improving the commander’s ability to employ 
forces and implement courses of action.  The 
decision aids will utilize environmental and 
intelligence data to position sensor and 
sensor platforms to provide optimal 
coverage.  This capability includes requests 
to higher authorities and requests to or 
support of non-assigned units operating 
within the area of operations, ships and 
units of foreign nations not under US 
command, and coordinating with external 
agencies and elements. 
 
E. PROVIDE HUMAN-CENTRIC INTEGRATION 
• Provide real-time, adaptable, man-machine 
systems. 
• To provide spatially synchronized, multi-
sensory human-computer interfaces capable of 
adapting/sharing workload between the human 
and computer based on the mission 
requirements in a way that seamlessly 
compliments human cognition and knowledge 
creation. 
• Provide multi-linear, cognitive processing 
warriors. 
• To provide Sailors and Marines who have the 
ability to read, speak, listen, and write 
simultaneously. 
• Protect friendly information outside the network. 
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• This capability includes operations security 
(OPSEC) and educating and preparing Sailors, 
Marines and individual units how to conduct 
exterior protection of own force 
information.  This is information that needs 
protection, but does not reside as part of 
the physical information network. 
 
F. PROVIDE INFORMATION WEAPONS 
• Deny, degrade and disrupt adversary information. 
• Conduct offensive electronic warfare and 
physical destruction in order to deny, 
degrade and disrupt the adversary’s ability 
to disseminate information, develop 
comprehensive situational awareness of the 
battle space and influence the adversary’s 
decision cycle. 
• Influence adversary perception. 
• Conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) and 
military deception operations (MILDEC).  
PSYOP will influence adversary population, 
leadership or military actions through the 
use of direct informational means.  MILDEC 
subtly delivers indirect information due to 
the need to retain secrecy.45 
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